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OPTIMAL TAX COMPLIANCE AND PENALTIES 
WHEN THE LAW IS UNCERTAIN 
Kyle D. Logue• 
This article examines the optimal level of tax compliance and the 
optimal penalty for noncompliance in circumstances in which the 
substance of the tax law is uncertain - that is, when the precise 
application of the Internal Revenue Code to a particular situation is not 
clear. In such situations, a number of interesting questions arise. This 
article will consider two of them. First, as a normative matter, how 
certain should taxpayers be before they rely on a particular 
interpretation of a substantively uncertain tax rule? If a particular 
position is not clearly prohibited but neither is it clearly allowed, what is 
the appropriate threshold of confidence that the taxpayer ought to have 
before engaging in the transaction? Second, what penalty regime would 
give the taxpayer the right incentive with respect to relying on 
substantively uncertain tax law? 
With these questions in mind, this article shows that, applying 
standard assumptions from the economic literature on deterrence, the 
tax penalty regime that would induce the optimal reliance (or non­
reliance) on uncertain tax laws depending on the circumstances would 
involve (1) a rule of strict liability with respect to taxes owed as well as 
to the penalty and (2) a penalty that roughly approximates the famous 
Bentham-Becker punitive fine, calculated by dividing the harm (the 
underpaid tax) by the ex ante probability that the harm would be 
detected. This article also explains why a fault-based approach to tax 
penalties, under the standard assumptions of the classical deterrence 
model, would not work as well as the strict liability approach. Reasons 
•Wade H. McCree, Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 
School. I would like to thank Alan Auerbach, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Omri Ben-Shahar, 
Neil Buchanan, James Hines, Daniel Shaviro, and the participants at the NYU School 
of Law Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance, the Northwestern School of 
Law Tax Policy Workshop, and the University of Michigan Public Finance Seminar 
for helpful criticism and commentary on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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for the inferiority of the fault-based approach include its comparatively 
high administrative costs, its inability to properly regulate "activity 
levels," and its relatively unattractive distributional consequences. This 
article concludes, however, that if Bentham-Becker level penalties or 
wide-spread use of tax liability insurance are not feasible, a second-best 
case can be made for using a fault-based penalty regime similar to the 
one currently in force. The framework used in this article may have 
implications for any area of law where the substantive law is uncertain. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the optimal level of tax compliance and the 
optimal penalty for noncompliance in circumstances in which the tax 
law is substantively uncertain - that is, when the precise application 
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of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) to a particular situation is not 
clear. These circumstances arise more often than one might think. 
There are many clear-cut cases in tax. For example, when tax 
protestors say that the U.S. tax laws do not require them to pay any 
tax on their U.S. income, they are wrong; and if they take such a 
position on their returns or, on the basis of this position, opt not to file 
returns at all, they will, if caught, face a substantial fine or even spend 
some time in jail. On the other hand, there are many close cases in tax. 
Say you take a trip to Miami, during which you attend a job­
related conference for one day and lounge on the beach sipping 
margaritas for two. Is the trip "primarily for business purposes" or 
not? Good question.1 Or say you are a taxpayer engaging in a 
transaction primarily for the purpose of reducing your income tax 
liability and the transaction entails some, but very little, economic 
substance. Will a court respect the form of the transaction and allow 
the tax treatment you have chosen? Another good question.2 These 
sorts of questions pervade the tax law, producing interesting issues for 
tax lawyers as well as good test questions for the basic income tax 
class in law school. This article addresses this sort of legal uncertainty. 
A number of interesting questions arise in these ambiguous 
situations. I will focus on two of them. First, as a normative matter, 
what degree of substantive legal certainty should taxpayers insist on 
before they rely on a particular interpretation of a tax rule? That is, if 
a given transaction is not clearly prohibited, but neither is it clearly 
allowed, what is the appropriate threshold of confidence that 
taxpayers ought to have before engaging in the transaction? Take the 
mixed business/personal Miami trip mentioned above. How sure 
should you be about the deductibility of those expenses before taking 
such a position on your return? Or how much economic substance 
must a transaction have - how likely must a pre-tax profit be - to 
justify actually going forward? If we can answer those questions, the 
1 .See Treas. Reg.§ l .162-2(b)(l) (as amended in 1995) ("If a taxpayer travels to 
a destination and while at such destination engages in both business and personal 
activities, traveling expenses to and from such destination are deductible only if the 
trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business."); Treas. Reg. § l . 162-
2(b)(2) (as amended in 1995) ("Whether a trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's 
trade or business or is primarily personal in nature depends on the facts and 
circumstances in each case."). 
2 See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (disallowing interest 
deduction on indebtedness incurred to purchase thirty-year fixed annuity on ground 
that the underlying transaction had no business purpose other than tax benefits and 
that there was no reasonable probability of pre-tax profit). 
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next question follows: what penalty regime would give taxpayers the 
right incentive with respect to relying on substantively uncertain tax 
law? 
To address these and related questions, I will use the following 
hypothetical: Joe Taxpayer (who can be thought of either as an 
individual investor, a business owner, or a manager of a corporation) 
is trying to decide whether to invest, or have his company invest, in a 
particular business transaction. In making this decision, Joe takes into 
account a range of issues, all of which boil down to one obvious 
question: how much money will the transaction make net of costs? As 
part of this analysis, Joe considers the legal consequences of the 
investment, including the likelihood that the investment might lead to 
some sort of civil litigation or government enforcement action. Joe 
evaluates these legal risks then weighs them against the expected 
benefits of the deal. Among the legal risks he contemplates are the 
possible tax consequences of the transaction. 
Now, focusing the analysis on the tax planning question, assume 
that from Joe's perspective (or that of his company) the investment is 
worth making only if it qualifies for a particular tax treatment. That is, 
assume the deal makes sense - its overall expected benefits exceed 
the overall expected costs - only if it qualifies as a "nontaxable 
transaction" or, alternatively, only if it generates a special tax loss or 
tax credit that can be used to offset taxes on other income. Thus, the 
after-tax profitability of the deal turns on the answer to the tax 
question. Now here is the problem: If Joe's expert tax advisor tells 
him that the special tax treatment he seeks for the transaction is 
neither clearly forbidden nor clearly legal under the existing tax laws, 
how should Joe proceed? In other words, if the law in question, at 
least as applied to Joe's particular transaction, is uncertain (in terms 
of how it will be applied ex post by the Internal Revenue Service 
(Service) or courts to particular transactions), what incentive does 
society want Joe to have in this situation? What is the optimal degree 
of tax compliance and what is the optimal tax penalty regime? 
As it turns out, the answers to these questions depend. on a 
number of factors. To see this point, let us simplify the analysis further 
by assuming that the only thing Joe cares about with respect to tax 
planning is the expected value of the sum of the possible back-taxes 
(plus interest) and the potential penalty. Joe, in other words, is a 
rational actor in the traditional economic sense of the term, a true 
homo economicus; more pejoratively, Joe is a quintessential example 
2007] Optimal Tax Compliance 245 
of Holmes's "bad man."3 Assume further that not only is Joe without 
a conscience but he faces no informal external sanctions either, such 
as social norms against tax noncompliance. Either his friends, 
neighbors, co-workers, and fellow corporate managers are utterly 
indifferent to Joe's reputation for paying his taxes, or he is indifferent 
to their opinions. 
Given all of these simplifying assumptions, Joe's decision 
regarding whether to undertake the particular transaction in question, 
and whether to report the transaction on his tax return in the desired 
manner, will depend on his ex ante assessment of (1) the probability 
that the particular tax position in question will be discovered and 
scrutinized by the Service, (2) the probability that, if detected, the 
position would be rejected by the Service and ultimately by a court, 
and (3) the size of the penalty in the event of both detection and 
rejection.4 Obviously Joe would not be able to estimate these variables 
with great precision, but presumably he would give it his best shot or 
pay a tax advisor to do so. It also seems sensible to assume that Joe 
would invest in additional information, up to the point at which the 
marginal cost of the additional information equals the marginal 
benefit gained from the information. Again, assuming there is some 
residual uncertainty even after these investments in information are 
made, then the question of whether the deal is profitable to Joe will 
depend on this evaluation of uncertain tax law and uncertain tax law 
enforcement. 
That is Joe's perspective. What about society's perspective? What 
does society want Joe to do when the substantive content of the law 
can only be estimated?5 Start with the two obvious and extreme 
3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 
(1897). Holmes states: 
Id. 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad 
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge 
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for 
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of 
conscience. 
4 Later in this article, I relax some of these assumptions and explore the 
implications for my analysis. 
5 There is an inherent difficulty in specifying what is the "right thing to do" in 
this context. Whether one has a consequentialist or deontological conception of 
ethical behavior, identifying the proper course of conduct when the substantive law is 
uncertain is problematic. In general, we might be able to agree that a taxpayer who is 
operating under conditions of substantive legal uncertainty ought to (and perhaps 
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positions. First, one could hold the view that Joe should go through 
with the transaction in question only if the tax position that makes the 
deal attractive - the tax-deferral or the special tax loss or special tax 
credit or whatever - is certain to be upheld by the Service and the 
courts. That is, Joe should adopt the particular interpretation only if 
he is certain that Congress intended for the preference to apply to the 
particular type of transaction that he is considering and to the 
particular class of taxpayers of which he is a member. Alternatively, 
one could hold the view that, so long as the tax position in question is 
not clearly and indisputably forbidden by the Code, the taxpayer 
should feel free to go through with it even if extraneous evidence, or 
common sense, makes clear that Congress did not have the taxpayer 
or his type of transaction in mind for this particular tax benefit. 
Obviously, neither of these extreme positions is the right answer. 
Rather, the right approach will depend on the circumstances. Indeed, 
this article contends that, when the substantive tax rules' meanings are 
uncertain, as applied to a taxpayer's particular situation, the taxpayer 
should (and inevitably will) make his decision based on his, or his 
legal expert's, probabilistic assessment of what the law actually is -
or what a court would say that it is. I argue further that the formal 
penalties for tax underpayment should incorporate arid enforce this 
concept of probabilistic compliance. Interestingly, as the discussion 
below explains, the existing tax penalties to some extent already take 
this approach. 
Part I of this article explains the primary sources of uncertainty in 
the income tax laws. Part II operationalizes the concept of substantive 
tax law uncertainty by adopting a probabilistic understanding of 
substantive law and by describing what I call the "tax compliance 
continuum." Part III adopts the assumption of "detection certainty," 
the idea that every tax position actually is scrutinized by the Service 
and demonstrates the deterrence benefits of a strict liability tax 
penalty regime, especially in terms of its ability to induce taxpayers to 
behave optimally with respect to ex ante legal uncertainty. Part IV 
should be induced by the law to) take tax positions that are in some sense reasonable, 
that represent neither abuse of the system nor charity to the government. Specifying 
what this concept of reasonableness entails is not a simple task and is beyond the 
scope of this article, although I will say a bit more about the question as the article 
proceeds. Unsurprisingly, however, the analysis in this article is largely 
consequentialist in orientation; as such, it conflates the ethical question of what 
course of action the taxpayer ought to follow, even if she could be certain that she will 
be undetected, with the law enforcement question about the incentives the law ought 
to create with respect to taxpayer behavior. 
2007] Optimal Tax Compliance 247 
introduces the problem of "detection uncertainty," known in the tax 
context colloquially as the "audit lottery," and shows how, under 
certain assumptions, the classic Bentham-Becker punitive penalty can 
induce taxpayers to internalize the expected tax liability associated 
with substantively uncertain tax positions. Part V explores the role 
that tax transaction liability insurance, whether privately or publicly 
provided, could play in such a strict liability tax penalty regime with a 
punitive Bentham-Becker penalty. Part VI explains (1) why, under 
traditional deterrence assumptions and assuming a fully deterring 
Bentham-Becker penalty, a fault-based tax penalty regime is inferior 
to a strict liability regime, but (2) why, assuming the Bentham-Becker 
penalty is unrealistic, a fault-based regime might be the second-most 
optimal. 
II. SOURCES OF T AX LAW UNCERTAINTY 
Before the analysis can get under way, an initial question is: why 
is there substantive tax law uncertainty in the first place? Those with 
only a passing familiarity with the U.S. tax laws might question the 
plausibility of the claim that the tax law is rife with uncertainty. After 
all, the U.S. federal income tax system is among the most detailed and 
comprehensive legal regimes in the world. Given the thousands of 
pages of the Code and umpteen-thousands of pages of Treasury 
Regulations,6 the nonexpert might be tempted to conclude that 
precise tax treatment of every conceivable transaction should be 
derivable from the existing tax laws, so long as one has the time to 
read and the expertise to understand the Code and regulations - or 
has the resources to hire someone else to do it. Everyone realizes, of 
course, that the Code is inscrutable to the common man but surely the 
tax cognoscenti, whose opinions can be bought for a price, can find 
the answers in all of those pages. For two general reasons, however, 
there is, and likely will always be, considerable uncertainty in the tax 
laws. The first has to do with the complexity of the laws. The second 
has to do with unintended gaps or loopholes in the law. 
By most accounts, the U.S. federal income tax is "the 
paradigmatic system of rules" rather than standards.7 A taxpayer's tax 
6 The full text of Title 26 of the U.S. Code was, at the time this footnote was 
written, 3387 pages long. According to the U.S. Government Printing Office, there 
are 13,458 pages of federal regulations devoted to interpreting the tax laws. 
7 David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860 
(1999). According to conventional legal theory, the distinction between rules and 
standards turns on the degree of ex ante versus ex post specification of the content of 
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liability is determined by applying a precise rate schedule to that 
taxpayer's taxable income. This sounds simple enough but, as already 
mentioned, the number of words in the Code that must be consulted 
to determine one's income tax liability is staggering. Furthermore, the 
level of specificity, and hence the complexity, with which the Code 
defines terms and explains procedures is legendary. Some of this 
complexity results from Congress's habitual attempts to enact social 
policy into the Code, whether it be subsidizing a particular form of 
investment (such as research and development) or a particular class of 
taxpayers (such as families or the poor). Another source of complexity 
is the attempts by Congress and the Treasury Department to close 
unintended loopholes in the tax laws, discussed further below. 
Whatever the source, the complexity of the tax rules is a primary 
source of substantive legal uncertainty. This sort of uncertainty is the 
primary reason why so many individual taxpayers either have their 
returns prepared by professionals or rely on computer programs such 
as Turbotax for assistance. Every year, as the Code increases in length 
and complexity, more taxpayers find it useful to seek expert help to 
reduce the uncertainty associated with filing their returns.8 
Complexity-induced uncertainty is a problem that plagues not only 
unsophisticated individuals but also wealthy individuals and large 
corporations who can afford expert legal advice. 
A second source of substantive legal uncertainty in the tax law is 
somewhat less familiar to nonexperts, although it is well known 
the legal norm in question. That is, a rule in this taxonomy is a legal norm whose 
application to particular situations is precisely and thoroughly specified in advance of 
the occurrence of the regulated activity in question. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561-62 (1992). With a rule, then, 
the role of the ex post adjudicator, the agency or court or whoever, is merely to 
determine what the facts are and which rule is applicable. By contrast, a standard 
leaves the contents of the legal norm vague such that the ex post adj udicator has 
greater flexibility, and greater responsibility, in deciding what the precise content of 
the legal norm is and how to apply it to particular situations after they arise. 
According to the economically oriented rules-standards literature, a rule makes sense 
when (1) the precise application of the legal norm to particular situations is relatively 
easy to define or identify in advance and (2) when the rule is expected to be applied 
with great frequency. By contrast, a standard may be preferred when an ex ante 
determination of the optimal conduct is relatively difficult and when the norm in 
question will be applied by the ex post adjudicator relatively infrequently. See 
generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 
65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974). 
8 Eric Toder, Changes in Tax Preparation Methods, 1993-2003, 107 TAX NOTES 
759 (May 9, 2005). 
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among tax lawyers, accountants, and even beginning tax students. 
Although there are obvious reasons to have numerous detailed tax 
rules (for example, to set out clearly the tax treatment of the most 
frequent types of transactions), there is simply no way for Congress or 
the Treasury Department to anticipate every contingency and provide 
in advance the precise tax treatment of every conceivable transaction 
or investment.9 The world is just too complex. Even if it were 
conceivable to fully specify the Code in this extreme sense, doing so 
would be unreasonable. At some point, the increased degree of ex 
ante precision in the law is outweighed by the cost of figuring out such 
details in advance and by the loss of flexibility that accompanies ex 
ante rulemaking. This is the source of the unintended loopholes 
mentioned above.10 
The problem of unintended loopholes appears especially bad 
when one considers taxpayers' incentives to find (or some would say, 
to create) these unintended gaps and exploit them to their advantage. 
Once an unintended loophole is found to work for one taxpayer, there 
is a natural tendency for others to use it as well .  Thus, what starts as a 
small gap in the tax laws can, under the right conditions, become a 
yawning chasm and the ultimate result can be both inefficiency 
(because taxpayers alter their investment decisions in the effort to 
minimize their taxes) and maldistribution of resources (because the 
ability to exploit tax loopholes is not evenly or otherwise fairly 
distributed across taxpayers).11 When this process of unintended­
loophole discovery and exploitation occurs, it is a virtual necessity that 
the Service and the courts be empowered to apply some general anti­
abuse gap filler, some statutory interpretive standard (in the rules­
standards sense of the word) that limits these opportunities. Examples 
9 See Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation: In the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983). Posner notes: 
The basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is 
not that they are poorly drafted - though many are - and not that the 
legislators failed to agree on just what they wanted to accomplish in the 
statute - though often they do fail - but that a statute necessarily is 
drafted in advance of, and with imperfect appreciation for the problems 
that will be encountered in, its application. 
Id. (citing EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 30-31 (1949)). 
10 An intentional loophole is different. Although for some that term might be 
oxymoronic (some consider the term loophole to entail a lack of intentionality on the 
part of the lawmaker), it is possible to conceive of an intended tax loophole as a way 
to describe those provisions in the tax laws designed to subsidize certain activities. 
11 See Weisbach, supra note 7, at 868. 
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of these anti-avoidance standards in tax law are the economic 
substance and business purposes doctrines.12 The use of such anti­
avoidance standards, however, comes at a cost to the system. 
Employing these ex post anti-avoidance standards increases ex ante 
substantive legal uncertainty, as taxpayers cannot know for sure in 
advance where the Service or a court will draw the economic 
substance or sham transaction line after the fact - just as a driver 
cannot know for certain where the negligent-driver line will be drawn. 
The uncertainty created by the existence of anti-avoidance doctrines is 
generally a good thing when compared with the alternative of 
allowing taxpayers to exploit all unintended loopholes with absolute 
impunity. 
One conclusion that follows from the preceding discussion is that 
some level of substantive tax law uncertainty is inevitable. This is not 
to say of course that Congress and the Treasury Department have no 
control over the amount, degree, or even the type of legal uncertainty 
that exists. Obviously they do. They can invest more or less time in 
specifying the rules in advance, more or less effort in avoiding 
unnecessary and confusing complexity. Indeed, there is a large 
political science literature that explores the question why and under 
what circumstances legislatures would intentionally write vague or 
ambiguous statutes, pointing out legislatures' desires to shift the 
responsibility of unpopular decisions to enforcement agencies, to 
courts,13 or to a legislature's inability to reach a stable consensus on 
legislative language.14 Moreover, particularly in the tax context, it is 
possible to conceive of Congress, perhaps with the cooperation of the 
Treasury Department, actually using the level of legal uncertainty as 
another tool in their tax enforcement toolbox. That is, if taxpayers are 
thought to be risk-averse, it is not difficult to imagine how 
strategically increasing tax law uncertainty, and hence the variance of 
12 DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
WHY THEY ARE A PROBLEM AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 1-2 (2004 ). 
13 See Peter H. Aranson et al . ,  A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 55-62 (1982) ; Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: 
Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46-52 (1982) ; Mark A. 
Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Ran Hirschi, The Political Origins of Judicial 
Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional 
Revolutions, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 91, 104 (2000); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive 
Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an 
Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 361-66 (1993). 
14 See, e.g., David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 432 (2002). 
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possible tax outcomes, in some contexts could serve the same function 
as increasing noncompliance penalties directly.15 Having said all of 
that, this article focuses on legal uncertainty that is unavoidable by 
lawmakers. Therefore, for most of this article, I assume that the 
choice of the optimal tax penalty and tax liability rule should ignore 
the effects of the penalty and rule on Congress's decision to increase 
or decrease the certainty of the laws. 
Ill. A CONCEPTION OF UNCERTAIN (OR PROBABILISTIC) TAX LAW: 
THE TAX COMPLIANCE CONTINUUM 
The next step in the analysis is to provide some functional content 
to the idea of substantive legal uncertainty. Uncertainty itself is a 
vague term. It could mean that the law is so vague that the taxpayer 
cannot begin to guess what it prohibits or allows. Some laws may elicit 
such an extreme reaction. The analysis of this article, however, will 
not provide much help in addressing that sort of profound legal 
uncertainty. Rather, it will focus on situations in which the law is not 
certain, but educated guesses can still be made about what the law 
means and how it will be applied to a given situation. 
One way to operationalize this conception of substantive legal 
uncertainty is to array the possible range of tax positions (or 
interpretations of the tax laws) along a continuum according to their 
probability of success on the merits assuming they are reviewed by a 
court.16 On one end of this continuum lie tax positions that are 
indisputably illegal. The probability that the Service and a court would 
uphold such positions if asked to do so is zero. Taking such a position 
on one's tax return would accurately be characterized as outright tax 
evasion. On the other end of the continuum are tax positions that are 
clearly legal, in the sense that the probability that the Service and the 
courts would sustain them on the merits, if presented with the 
question, is equal to one. In between these two extreme points are an 
infinite number of possible tax positions with varying ex ante 
probabilities of success on the merits. Figure 1 captures the idea of 
this tax compliance continuum. 
15 This possibility was formally demonstrated in Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel 
Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J. Pus. ECON. 17 (1989). 
16 Thus, one way of resolving the problem of substantive legal uncertainty is to 
engage in what Michael Abramowicz calls "predictive decisionmaking." Michael 
Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69 (2006) . 
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FIGURE 1. MEASURING SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
Clearly 
Illegal 
0 
Probability of Winning on the Merits 
I I I I I I I I I 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
1.0 
Clearly 
Legal 
This continuum is useful not only because the two endpoints illustrate 
the most extreme positions, but also because the continuum allows a 
whole range of tax positions to be graded on the basis of their relative 
aggressiveness according to their relative position on the continuum. 
Thus, as we move from right to left along the continuum in Figure 1, 
the various tax positions represented by the continuum become 
increasingly aggressive in the sense that their probability of being 
rejected on the merits by a court, if detected, increases.11 
It is easy to conceive of tax positions that would fall on either end 
of this continuum. On the clearly illegal side are those taxpayers who 
simply decline to report cash income or intentionally take deductions 
for expenses that were never incurred. Such behavior constitutes 
obvious illegal tax evasion. Obvious tax evasion might also include 
hiding income in illegal foreign accounts. Given the zero or near-zero 
probability that such positions would be upheld on the merits if 
detected, the only motivation for taking them is the hope of going 
undetected. On the other end of the spectrum, there are many tax 
positions that are clearly legal: a simple business expense deduction or 
the exclusion of an item that is clearly a gift. There is little dispute that 
the tax treatment of many transactions is clear and that the answer to 
many particular tax questions can be known with a high degree of 
certainty. 
More interesting are the many tax positions that fall between zero 
and one in terms of probability of success on the merits. As any tax 
practitioner or any student in an introductory federal income tax class 
can tell you, almost all of the interesting tax questions fall in this 
range. This holds true regardless of whether the area is corporate, 
17 It is possible that substantive legal uncertainty in many areas of law might 
usefully be understood in terms of this legal uncertainty continuum. In this article, I 
focus exclusively on substantive uncertainty in the tax laws. 
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partnership, or individual income taxation. In fact, a reasonable case 
can be made that the vast majority of the tax issues that end up being 
decided by a court had, at the time the transaction was planned and 
carried out, a positive-but-less-than-one probability of success on the 
merits. Even the most infamous tax-shelter cases, the largely extinct 
1970s real-estate-limited-partnership kind as well as the more recent 
corporate-shelter variety, would doubtless fall somewhere to the right 
of "clearly illegal" on the continuum.18 Of course, for most tax-shelter 
transactions, there would be disagreement about exactly where on the 
continuum the various shelter transactions fall. 19 But for almost all 
such transactions, one could at least imagine using something like the 
continuum above to assess the relative aggressiveness of the 
taxpayers' positions. 
Conceiving of the tax compliance decision in such probabilistic, 
predictive terms will often not comport with reality. Although we may 
be accustomed to viewing some taxpayers as quintessential rational 
actors - I have in mind those taxpayers who spend a great deal of 
time and money to find loopholes in the law - it is quite a different 
matter to imagine the average individual taxpayer making a 
probabilistic calculation to determine what the substantive tax law in 
fact is. Hence this analysis may not apply to average taxpayers filing 
out their 1040EZ. At least for sophisticated taxpayers, however, (by 
which I mean taxpayers with sufficient resources and incentives to 
hire expert legal advisors) such probabilistic estimates are a part of 
the game.20 In fact, the Code and regulations make the application of 
18 For a general description of the difference between the individual tax shelters 
of the 1970s and the corporate shelters of the 1990s, see Joseph Bankman, The New 
Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775 (June 21, 1999). 
19 This point is proven by the fact that highly regarded tax experts often disagree 
over the characterization of a given transaction as an "abusive tax shelter" or an 
example of "legitimate tax planning." See, e.g., James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate 
Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135, 158-59 (2002); David P. 
Hariton, Kafka and the Tax Shelter, 57 TAX L. REV. 1 (2003). 
20 I do not mean to suggest that there is a large class of taxpayers who are 
constantly doing probability calculations to determine what the law is with regard to 
every tax provision. However, with respect to the tax law provisions that (1) are 
uncertain in application and (2) can have a significant effect on tax liabilities, many 
sophisticated taxpayers in fact do such probabilistic calculations. Either explicitly or 
implicitly, they assess what the Internal Revenue Service (Service) and a court will 
likely say the law is. This sort of rational cost-benefit calculation with respect to 
uncertain tax provisions may be very widespread, insofar as even many individual 
taxpayers rely on professional tax return preparers, who are presumably incentivized 
to consider the probabi lities of various legal outcomes. 
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tax penalties for noncompliance depend on such probabilistic 
predictive assessments. In that sense, the existing tax penalty structure 
already incorporates something like the tax compliance continuum 
described above. That is to say, if the Service and the courts determine 
after the fact that a particular position taken by a taxpayer is wrong -
and thus that the taxpayer owes additional taxes - then the 
determination of whether the taxpayer must pay additional penalties 
depends on the Service's (and, if the case winds up in court, the 
court's) ex post assessment of the taxpayer's ex ante probability of 
success on the merits. 
To get a sense of how a probabilistic predictive analysis of the 
meaning of an uncertain legal rule might work, consider a current tax 
compliance penalty provision. Under existing law, if a taxpayer 
understates her tax liability (that is, the Service and courts determine 
that she took an impermissible tax position),  she will generally have to 
pay, in addition to the back-taxes and interest, a penalty of 20% of the 
understated tax unless she can persuade the Service or a court ex post 
that the position in question ex ante had approximately a 40% chance 
or better of prevailing on the merits assuming the issue were reviewed 
by a court.21 Such uncertain legal positions are said to have 
"substantial authority."22 Thus, the current taxpayer penalty regime 
for tax underpayments incorporates a version of the sort of 
21 I .RC. § 6662. 
22 More precisely, the 20% substantial understatement penalty will be assessed 
unless the taxpayer can demonstrate ex post that she ex ante had "substantial 
authority" for the position. I .RC. § 6662(d)(2)(B). The official meaning of 
"substantial authority" found in the Treasury Regulations is maddeningly circular. See 
Treas. Reg. § l.6662-4(d)(3) (as amended in 2003) ("There is substantial authority for 
the tax treatment of an item only if the weight of the authorities supporting the 
treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of authorities supporting contrary 
treatment."). The concept of substantial authority is further defined, however, with 
reference to where it falls on something like the tax compliance continuum in the text 
above. Thus, substantial authority is understood as an objective test that is "less 
stringent than the more likely than not standard (the standard that is met when there 
is a greater than 50% likelihood of the position being upheld), but more stringent 
than the reasonable basis standard." Treas. Reg. § l .6662-4(d)(2) (as amended in 
2003). These latter two standards are discussed further in the text immediately below. 
The actual 40% figure is found nowhere in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) or 
regulations but is often suggested by practitioners and commentators as a rough 
statistical approximation of the idea. See, e. g. ,  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
103D CONG., COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF 
AND TREASURY RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO PENALTY AND INTEREST 
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 13 (Joint Comm. Print 1999), available 
at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-79-99.pdf. 
-� 
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probabilistic predictive assessment that I describe above; implicit in 
the whole analysis is the assumption that the substantive tax law itself 
is uncertain. This definition of substantial authority is not the only 
example of probabilistically assessed tax penalties. Tax penalties can 
also be avoided if the taxpayer can show that (1)  the tax position at 
issue was disclosed to the Service, and (2) the position had a 
"reasonable basis" in the law (i.e., a 20% chance of prevailing on the 
merits, assuming detection).23 Thus, if you bring your uncertain tax 
position to the Service's attention, you are allowed to be somewhat 
more aggressive, in the sense of taking a position that is a little further 
to the left on the tax compliance continuum.24 
There are other examples of the probabilistic reasoning of this 
sort in the area of tax enforcement. For certain categories of 
transactions that the Service has reason to believe are of questionable 
legitimacy, because of the nature of the transactions or because of the 
Service's experience with similar transactions in the past, special rules 
apply. For example, these transactions must be reported to the 
Service; hence the term "reportable" transactions.25 In addition, to 
avoid underpayment penalties for such transactions, the taxpayer 
must be able to show not only that the tax position in question had 
substantial authority (as defined above) but also that she reasonably 
believed the position was "more likely than not" correct.26 That is, she 
23 I .RC.§ 6662(d)(2)(B). 
24 This lower standard, or willingness to waive penalties for relatively aggressive 
tax positions that are disclosed, does not apply to so-called "tax shelters," defined 
here as "(I) a partnership or other entity, (II) any investment plan or arrangement, or 
(III) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, 
entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax." 
I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii). Thus, if your transaction can be characterized as a tax 
shelter, even if you disclose it to the Service, you incur risk penalties for substantial 
tax understatements unless you can show that the position had at least a 40% chance 
of winning on the merits. There is also a general exception to any substantial 
understatement penalty if taxpayers can demonstrate that they had "reasonable cause 
for" and "acted in good faith with respect to" the position in question. I .RC. 
§ 6664(d). I will have more to say about this "reasonableness" exception below. 
25 "Reportable transactions" include, for example, "listed transactions" (which 
are specific tax avoidance transactions that have been publicly identified by the 
Service for special scrutiny), "confidential transactions" (which are done under 
conditions in which the tax advisor has insisted on some sort of confidentiality 
agreement), transactions that involve "contractual protection" (where the taxpayer 
has right to a full or partial refund of the tax advisor's fees if the position is not 
sustained). Treas. Reg.§ l .6011-4(b) (1960). 
26 I .RC.§ 6664(d). 
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must have reasonably had the view that the position would fall to the 
right of the mid-point on the tax compliance continuum of Figure l.27 
As if all these probabilistic standards were not enough, there are 
also the rules governing tax preparer penalties. Thus, a tax preparer 
can be penalized for signing a return or endorsing a tax position that 
does not have at least a "realistic possibility of success," which is 
sometimes quantified to mean at least a 33 % chance of winning on the 
merits, assuming detection is certain.28 Alternatively, if the position in 
question is disclosed to the Service, the preparer can still sign the 
return and avoid penalties so long as the position is at least not 
"frivolous," which some have quantified as something greater than a 
10% chance of winning on the merits.29 Taxpayers themselves also are 
subject to special penalties for filing frivolous returns and an even 
greater penalty for taking positions that are clearly illegal. 
If one wanted to array all of these various points along the 
relative continuum of uncertain tax positions, it would look like this: 
FIGURE 2. MEASURING SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
Clearly 
Illegal 
0 
"Not Frivolous" 
"Reasonable Basis" 
"Realistic Possibility of Success" 
[ "Substantial Authority" r r'More lik<ly""" ™"' 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Probability of winning on the merits if detected 
I Cl=lyL'"'' 
1.0 
All of these various penalties depend not on whether the 
particular tax position at issue is legal or illegal, but on the position's 
ex ante probability of being legal or illegal as determined either by the 
21 Id. 
28 Treas. Reg.§ 1.6694-2(c) (as amended in 1992). Again, the percentage chance 
of success is a rough statistical approximation of the idea. See, e.g. , STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE, supra note 22, at 13. 
29 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, COMPARISON OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 22, at 13. 
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Service, a court, or the taxpayer. Later in this article I will return to 
the question of whether the above described penalty scheme, or some 
modified version of it, can be justified on deterrence grounds. But first 
let us logically consider the prior questions, mentioned in the 
introduction: what is the socially optimal ex ante probability-of­
winning-on-the-merits threshold that taxpayers ought to apply in 
making tax planning decisions? And what tax penalty regime creates 
the incentives most likely to achieve that result? 
At this point, I need to be clear about what I mean by "optimal" 
and "efficient" in this context. In one sense, the efficient result in this 
example would be if the tax could be designed so that Joe Taxpayer 
could utterly ignore it and thus, make his investment decisions entirely 
on the basis of his pre-tax calculations. Put differently, the most 
efficient, or least distortive, tax is not an income tax at all but some 
form of lump sum tax, perhaps a head tax. I am assuming that society, 
through Congress, has decided that the overall social-welfare­
maximizing form of taxation is an income tax, one that allocates tax 
burdens in a particular way depending on taxpayers' individual levels 
of income and that, despite its distortive effects, such an income tax is 
overall socially optimal. Thus, when I speak of designing the 
"optimal" tax penalty, I mean the penalty that induces compliance 
with the law, taking the level of taxation and allocation of the tax 
burden across different levels of income as given - as having been 
decided (in some sense correctly, or socially optimally) by Congress.30 
IV. STRICT TAX LIABILITY AND THE OPTIMAL MERITS 
PROBABILITY THRESHOLD 
To begin to answer these questions, consider the example of Joe 
Taxpayer in greater detail. Imagine Joe is considering a single 
transaction or investment that is guaranteed to produce a pre-tax 
profit of $75. Now assume further that there are only two possible tax 
treatments of that transaction: either it will produce a tax liability of 
$1 00 or it will produce no tax liability at all.31 Thus, the overall 
profitability of the transaction depends on the ultimate tax 
consequences; it either produces an after-tax gain of $75 or an after-
30 Another way of understanding this point is to imagine that Congress, in its 
infinite wisdom, understands that the tax laws will have some level of irreducible 
uncertainty, and that the optimal penalty regime will need to be adjusted to take this 
fact into account. 
31 All of the numbers are assumed to be discounted to present value. 
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tax loss of $25.32 The problem, of course, is that Joe does not know 
with certainty what the tax consequences will be. This is one of those 
transactions for which neither Congress nor the Treasury Department 
has clearly specified the tax treatment. Hence, the best that Joe can do 
is estimate, or have his lawyer or accountant estimate, the probability 
that the zero-tax interpretation of the transaction will be upheld if 
detected and then make his investment decision accordingly. 
Let us also assume that the tax law uncertainty that Joe faces will 
be resolved only after he has made the investment and only after 
several years - however long it takes for the Service to select Joe's 
return for audit and either reject or accept the tax position in question 
or for the statute of limitations on that return year to run. This 
assumption also implies that Joe cannot, at a reasonable cost or within 
a reasonable time, get a private letter ruling to resolve the uncertainty 
before the investment is made. Assume that, once the transaction is 
undertaken, it cannot reasonably be unwound or reversed should the 
tax treatment on which the taxpayer relies happen to be struck down. 
Rather, in the event the tax position turns out to be wrong, Joe simply 
has to absorb the extra taxes and penalties, which in this case would 
again mean that the transaction, from an ex post perspective, would 
be a net after-tax loser. On a related point, I assume initially that it is 
impossible to purchase private insurance against the possibility of an 
adverse tax decision and, in any event, that Joe is risk neutral in the 
sense of being indifferent between two prospects with differing levels 
of variance but equal expected values. I relax these assumptions 
below.33 
Finally, begging the reader's indulgence, a few additional 
assumptions common to the economic analysis of law are necessary 
for the analysis to proceed. The particular implications of these 
assumptions will be explored later in this article. First, recall the 
assumptions from the introduction that the taxpayer is a rational actor 
in the traditional sense and cares only about maximizing after-tax 
returns. These are obviously essential to the deterrence analysis that 
follows and are customary in the relevant deterrence literatures. 
Second, it is assumed throughout this article that the federal tax laws, 
32 In effect, I am assuming that even if the transaction has an expected after-tax 
profit of only one cent, it will be enough to induce Joe Taxpayer to invest. This is 
obviously an unrealistic assumption, but it is useful for purposes of simplicity and 
does not detract from the overall point of the analysis. 
33 The other assumption that is essential to this deterrence analysis is that Joe 
has sufficient assets to pay whatever tax penalty is assessed ex post - that is, Joe is 
not "judgment-proof." 
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as ultimately interpreted by a court, represent the will of Congress 
and are therefore presumptively social-welfare-maximizing. This 
assumption has two components. First, whatever Congress intends for 
the tax laws to mean is what maximizes social welfare; this includes 
both the allocative and distributive consequences of the tax laws. 
Thus, if Congress decides that a taxpayer who earns $30,000 should 
pay 10% in taxes and a taxpayer who makes $200,000 should pay 30% 
in taxes (perhaps because, for example, our society has decided that 
high-income people place a lower marginal value on money than do 
low-income people) then that result is, in some sense, social-welfare­
maximizing.34 Second, whenever it is unclear what tax treatment 
Congress intended for a particular transaction, that question is 
answered definitively and accurately when a court renders a tax 
decision. Both of these assumptions are obviously unrealistic. We all 
know how Congress (with the President's help) can and does 
mismanage the tax system. Courts are likewise notorious for getting 
tax decisions wrong. Nevertheless, to render the deterrence analysis 
tractable, these assumptions - that Congressional intent is welfare 
maximizing and that courts are always right - are necessary. 
Moreover, if one is especially troubled by the quality of Congress's tax 
lawmaking record or by the courts' performance in tax cases, those 
issues should be addressed directly.35 
With that lengthy but necessary setup, we can now begin to isolate 
the factors that determine what the optimal ex ante tax compliance 
incentives would be in Joe Taxpayer's situation. This part of the 
analysis relies on the traditional lens of deterrence theory as it has 
been developed in the economic analysis of legal rules.36 In that 
34 Such a conclusion, of course, does not entail the further conclusion that 
achieving this result, collecting 10% from the $30,000 person and 30% from the 
$200,000 person, is worth any cost. On this view, even the goal of achieving society's 
distributional goals is subject to some budget constraint. 
35 I also realize that the vast majority of tax controversies end with a settlement 
between the Service and the taxpayer, and thus the courts never get an opportunity in 
most cases to render a final decision on the merits of most questions of tax law 
uncertainty. Put differently, in most circumstances, the Service is the final "ex post 
adjudicator" of the question of how the tax laws apply to a particular transaction. This 
fact introduces further complications to the deterrence analysis. I ignore those 
complications and assume that either the Service gets it right (and interprets the 
unclear tax laws consistently with congressional intent and thus maximization of social 
welfare) or the Service's decision gets reviewed by a court that sets things right. 
36 See, e.g. , A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 37-49 (1983); STEVEN SHA YELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 
(1987). 
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literature, the two most important normative questions are (1) what is 
the optimal liability rule - strict liability, some variant of negligence, 
or fault; and (2) what is the optimal level of damages in the private 
enforcement context, or the optimal fine in the public enforcement 
context.37 Applying this framework, it should be clear as an initial 
matter - although it is never expressed this way in the tax compliance 
literature - that if Joe Taxpayer's position is certain to be scrutinized 
by the Service because the probability of detection is one, then the 
optimal tax liability rule is strict liability and the optimal fine is simply 
the amount of additional taxes owed plus an appropriate interest 
charge to account for the time value of money. This combination will 
produce the right ex ante compliance incentives and will induce Joe to 
make the investment described above only if it is efficient for him to 
do so. 
Interestingly, this conclusion suggests that such a strict tax liability 
rule will induce the taxpayer to behave optimally with respect to the 
question of legal uncertainty; in particular, it will give him the 
incentive to choose the optimal threshold probability of success on the 
merits. In the above example, the social-welfare-maximizing choice 
would be for Joe to make the investment if the probability that the 
position will be upheld on the merits is greater than 0.25, but not 
otherwise. For any probability of success on the merits greater than 
0.25, the transaction is a positive net-present-value investment after 
taxes, but not otherwise.38 A few simple examples illustrate this point. 
If the probability of success on the merits for this transaction was 
30%,  the expected tax cost associated with the investment would be 
$70, still less than the pre-tax profit of $75; hence the deal, for Joe and 
for society, is worth pursuing.39 If the probability of success on the 
merits was 20%,  the expected tax cost would be $80, making the deal 
a $5 loser in after-tax terms.40 Given these numbers, the optimal merits 
probability threshold is 25 % .  This number is entirely an artifact of the 
37 For a comprehensive survey of the economic analysis of deterrence in the 
context of public enforcement of legal rules, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven eds., 2007). 
38 If you know the pre-tax profit of the transaction will be $75 and you know the 
potential tax outcomes are either zero or $100 in taxes, the optimal merits probability 
threshold can be calculated by solving for x in the following equation: (x * 0) + ((1-x) 
* 100) = 75. 
39 The expected tax cost using these numbers is calculated as follows: (0.3 * 0) + 
(0.7 * 100) = $70. 
40 (0.2 * 0) + (0.8 * 100) = $80. 
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arbitrary parameters of the example but the more general point still 
holds. Assuming detection certainty - the idea that every tax issue 
gets evaluated by a court and thus that all ex ante uncertainty gets 
resolved ex post - a rule of strict tax liability that requires the 
taxpayer to pay the additional taxes ex post in the event the Service or 
a court finds his position to have been wrong will induce him to 
internalize his ex ante expected tax liability. This will work with 
whatever numbers are used in the example. 
To put the point even more generally, when taxpayers face 
conditions of legal uncertainty, social welfare is maximized if they 
make investment decisions on the basis of their best estimate of the 
ultimate resolution of that uncertainty. To achieve this result, society 
wants to make individuals and firms internalize the expected value of 
the harm that their decisions might cause; harm, in this instance, 
would be the amount of under-paid taxes. This conclusion is 
consistent with the conventional wisdom in the economic analysis of 
tort law, where cost internalization through strict liability is well 
understood to achieve efficiency in certain settings and under 
assumptions similar to those made in this article.41 For example, in the 
products liability context, if a product manufacturer is trying to decide 
whether to manufacture and sell a particular product (or whether to 
make a particular safety innovation in an existing product), the 
existence of a strict liability tort rule induces that company ex ante to 
take into account the expected harm that its product might cause (or 
the expected reduction in harm that the safety innovation might 
yield). In essence, this is what a strict liability rule in the tax context 
does as well. 
Thus, a regime that makes Joe Taxpayer pay the $1 00 in back­
taxes in the event the Service and courts reject his tax position will 
induce him to make the social-welfare-maximizing ex ante choice 
regarding when to take advantage of a given legally uncertain tax 
benefit.42 It is also worth making two other aspects of this conclusion 
explicit. First, it highlights the fact that there is no a priori correct 
merits probability threshold apart from what is optimal under the 
41 See SHA YELL, supra note 36, at 23. 
42 Henceforth, I ignore the requirement that the award include adequate interest 
to account for the time value of money. This is a customary assumption in the 
economic analysis of legal rules. In the real world, of course, the interest charge that 
the law imposes on taxpayers for tax deficiencies does not precisely equal the rate at 
which the taxpayer was able to invest those funds. The tax system's failure to calibrate 
interest charges properly can produce over- or under-deterrence, just as if the amount 
of taxes owed were over-stated or under-stated. 
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circumstances as described above.43 Second, the optimal merits 
probability threshold will depend on a number of factors including the 
amount of the potential tax cost (or tax savings) associated with the 
transaction if the taxpayer loses (or wins), the amount (and the 
certainty) of the pre-tax profit expected from the transaction, and, if 
we lower the assumption of risk neutrality, the taxpayer's taste for 
risk, though I have assumed risk neutrality to this point. Thus, all else 
equal, the higher the potential tax cost (or savings) associated with the 
transaction, the higher the minimal threshold probability of success on 
the merits will be.44 This makes intuitive sense. If the tax aspect of a 
particular transaction is very large relative to the expected pre-tax 
profit from that transaction, we want the taxpayer - and the taxpayer 
herself should want - to be certain about the substantive law in 
question before going forward with the deal. Along the same lines, the 
relationship between the expected pre-tax profit and the optimal 
merits probability threshold also makes intuitive sense. If the nontax 
aspect of a particular deal is relatively large, compared to the tax 
savings, the taxpayer can afford (and society would want her) to be 
more aggressive in her interpretation of uncertain tax laws. 
A number of interesting observations follow from this analysis. 
First, even if the probability of success on the merits for a given tax 
position is extremely low, it can be socially optimal for the taxpayer to 
engage in the transaction and take the questionably legal position, so 
long as she believes that the expected pre-tax profit from the 
transaction exceeds the expected tax liability. This is a point that is 
sufficiently counterintuitive (and interesting) to bear restating in a 
slightly different way. Socially optimal behavior, in a world with 
substantive legal uncertainty, can and often will include actions that 
turn out, after the substantive legal uncertainty is resolved, to have 
been illegal. That is just another way of saying that whenever there is 
substantive legal uncertainty, it is not the case that inaction - or 
43 This conclusion is largely a function of the current strong assumptions. Stated 
again, I am assuming that the only deterrent here is the formal penalty. Not only is 
Joe Taxpayer not subject to any i nformal sanctions from his colleagues or peers for 
being too aggressive on his tax returns but he has no conscience either: he does 
whatever is optimal under the law. Of course, informal sanctions do exist, and most 
people do have a conscience; the entire deterrence calculus can change when those 
facts are admitted. I return to this possibility at the end of this article. 
44 To see this using my example, imagine that the potential tax outcomes were 
multiplied by three (i.e., either $300 or $0 in taxes). In that case, the threshold 
probability of success on the merits would be tripled as well (to 0.75). This can be 
determined by setting the expected profit from the transaction ($75) equal to (x * 0) + 
((1-x) * 300) and solving for x. 
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declining to interpret the uncertain law in one's favor - is always the 
best, most social-welfare-maximizing approach. Where the substantive 
law is uncertain, a conservative interpretation of the law is not always 
optimal; to the contrary, sometimes optimality calls for aggressiveness 
in the face of substantive legal uncertainty. 
This conclusion depends critically on the probability of detection 
being one - that is, the complete absence of detection uncertainty. If 
the probability of detection is less than one, this conclusion obviously 
does not follow, unless there is a penalty large enough to approximate 
the effect of detection certainty, as will be discussed at some length 
below. So let me be very clear that I am not advocating a regime that 
encourages or allows taxpayers to take tax positions that have a very 
low probability of success on the merits - which is one way of 
understanding what is normally meant by an "aggressive" tax position 
- unless we have in place a deterrence regime that either makes 
detection a certainty or imposes an ex post punitive penalty that has 
roughly the same ex ante effect as certain detection. 
A second interesting observation that flows from the analysis 
above is that the strict tax liability rule works even for transactions 
that promise no pre-tax profit, that is, in circumstances in which the 
tax position in question - for example, the special deduction or credit 
- is the factor making the deal potentially profitable. Strict tax 
liability produces optimal compliance incentives not only in situations 
in which the transaction depends on the tax outcome for its overall 
profitability, but also in situations in which a transaction is expected to 
produce a pre-tax loss. These sorts of transactions are of course the 
source of much debate in the tax literature and are sometimes given 
pejorative labels such as "abusive tax shelters" or transactions that 
"lack economic substance."45 Even for such transactions, if the 
probability of detection is 100%, and everyone knows this, a simple 
strict tax liability rule optimizes taxpayer compliance incentives. 
The Joe Taxpayer example can be tweaked slightly to illustrate 
this last point. Assume now that the transaction is expected to lose $5 
before taxes but promises the possibility of either producing a tax 
45 Obviously, not all tax transactions are expected to have pre-tax losses, but 
post-tax gains are considered abusive tax shelters. For example, some transactions 
that are designed to exploit explicit tax subsidy provisions in the Code, which might 
be called "intended loopholes," fall into this category. One of the biggest issues in the 
tax shelter literature, arguably the central issue in that debate, is the question of how 
to distinguish the unintended from the intended tax loopholes. For the purposes of 
this article, again, I am assuming that the Service and the courts can figure this out in 
their ex post evaluations of tax positions. 
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liability of $50 (for an after-tax loss of $55) or, perhaps by producing a 
credit or a loss deduction that can be used to offset taxes from some 
other source, a net tax savings of $100 (for an after-tax gain of $95).  
Given those possibilities, the break-even or optimal merits probability 
threshold for Joe's situation is roughly 0.3. Thus, Joe will be willing to 
engage in the transaction - and, from an efficiency perspective, 
should be willing to engage in the transaction - if the probability that 
this position will win on the merits is anything greater than 30% ,  but 
not otherwise.46 Of course, the precise probability threshold is entirely 
an artifact of the numbers that I have chosen for the example, but the 
point is fairly general. Because the strict tax liability rule forces Joe to 
internalize the ex ante expected value of his ex post tax liability, he 
will invest in the transaction only if it is optimal to do so, so he will 
choose the optimal merits probability threshold, whatever that may be 
under the circumstances. 
V. THE PROBLEM OF DETECTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE 
B ENTHAM-BECKER SOLUTION 
The preceding analysis assumed, among many other things, that 
the probability of detection - the combined probability that the 
taxpayer's return would be selected for audit and the particular issue 
in question would be scrutinized - was equal to one. This is an 
especially fanciful assumption in the tax context, at least with respect 
to the sort of sophisticated transactions that this article is focusing on 
- transactions that involve navigating the intended and unintended 
loopholes in the Code. For such transactions, the probability of 
detection is notoriously low. This is true both because the audit rate 
itself is far less than 100% and because, even when a return is audited, 
there is a good chance that such tax positions will go unnoticed by the 
Service.47 Although no one knows what the precise probability of 
46 To find this percentage, set (x * 100) + ((1-x) * (-50)) equal to -5, and then 
solve for x. 
47 According to the most recent Service statistics, the 2005 audit rates were as 
follows: all individuals (0.9%); individuals with under $25,000 of income (1.5%); 
individuals with under $100,000 of income (0.8%); corporations with assets over $10 
million (20%); corporations with assets over $250 million (44% ); corporations with 
assets under $10 million (0.8%). INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 2005, 
PUBL'N 55B, at 19 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05databk.pdf. 
Based on research from data from earlier years, it appears that, of those taxpayers 
who are audited, only a small percentage (as low as 4% ) are actually penalized. James 
Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 
821 (1998). Note that audit rates for individuals are much higher for certain types of 
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detection is for any given type of tax position (even the Service, which 
does have data on audit rates for different categories of taxpayers and 
has confidential information about its own enforcement priorities, 
cannot know what the ultimate detection probability is for a particular 
tax position), such probability is almost certainly very low for many of 
the transactions that characterize the zone of substantive legal 
uncertainty. The result, of course, is that a tax penalty regime of strict 
liability in which the only penalty is the "harm" - the additional taxes 
plus interest - woefully under-deters. Thus, with probability of 
detection significantly below one, unless we assume massive levels of 
risk aversion, taxpayers have an incentive to engage in transactions 
(and take tax positions) that are far too aggressive from an overall 
social welfare perspective. Indeed, the current problem of the tax gap, 
the difference between the taxes owed and the taxes paid, is almost 
certainly a result of the fact that the vast majority of taxpayers who 
underpay their taxes never get caught, and everyone knows that. 
The effect of detection uncertainty on taxpayer aggressiveness can 
easily be illustrated by making a small but important change to the 
Joe Taxpayer example. Imagine the situation as described in the 
original example above (a $75 expected pre-tax profit with a potential 
tax liability of $100 or $0), except that the probability of detection is 
not 100% but is, for example, 1 %. If the fine is then set equal to the 
amount of back-taxes owed with no additional penalty, the taxpayer 
would have an incentive to make the investment, in reliance on the tax 
position in question, even if the probability of winning the position on 
the merits were zero and that particular tax position were clearly 
illegal.48 Indeed, in the current Joe Taxpayer example, Joe would have 
an incentive to make the investment, despite the position being 
unquestionably illegal, for any probability of detection less than 
75%.49 Again, the particular numbers are arbitrary, but the principle is 
well known among tax practitioners and analysts: the lower the 
errors, such as omitting income that is reported on information returns. Joel Slemrod, 
Trust in Public Finance 9 (Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus. , Office of Tax Policy Research, 
Working Paper No. 2002-7, 2002), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/ 
WP2002-7paper.pdf. 
48 The expected value of the $100 in taxes would be $1, although the probability 
of winning on the merits if detected is zero and $1 is obviously less than the pre-tax 
profit expected from the transaction. 
49 Since the expected pre-tax profit is $75, the expected fine would have to be 
$75 or greater. If the position is patently i llegal, given the potential tax liability of 
$100, the expected tax liability will be less than $75 for any probability of detection 
less than 75%.  
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probability of detection - all else being equal the larger the 
incentive that taxpayers have to take aggressive tax positions.50 
The problem of low probabilities of detection is one of the oldest 
and most thoroughly discussed issues in the entire deterrence 
literature. At least since Jeremy Bentham, theorists have understood 
the relationship between the probability of detection, the magnitude 
of the penalty, and the appropriate level of deterrence.51 It was Gary 
Becker who first formalized this relationship in the criminal law 
context and who further identified the optimal solution to the 
deterrence problem, assuming that the cost of increasing the 
probability of detection - that is, money spent on detecting law 
violators - is a deadweight social loss. Becker's solution is to spend 
relatively little on detection, but to increase the ex post penalty until 
the potential perpetrator is induced ex ante to act as if the probability 
of detection were one.52 Such a Bentham-Becker penalty is calculated 
by dividing the harm caused by the probability of detection. To 
illustrate, if a crime is expected to cause a harm of 100, such that the 
optimal cost-internalizing sanction would be $100, but the probability 
of detection is 0.01, the optimal fine would be $10,000 - that is, the 
amount of the harm (100) divided by the probability of detection 
(0.01). Or, if you prefer multiplying, the amount of harm multiplied by 
the reciprocal of the detection probability. The theory is that such a 
penalty makes the expected value of the fine equal the harm. Thus, in 
general, so long as (1) the ex post adjudicator can accurately 
determine both the ex ante probability of detection and the amount of 
the harm (for purposes of this article, the actual taxes owed as 
determined by the adjudicator in resolving the legal uncertainty) , (2) 
taxpayers or their advisors are aware of this fact, and (3) taxpayers 
have sufficient assets at risk to care about large ex post penalty, then 
the use of such an ex post penalty regime can create the proper ex 
ante tax compliance incentives.53 Indeed, under such a regime, people 
50 The one possible qualification to this observation involves the interaction 
between formal and informal sanctions. If people are prevented from taking illegal 
positions by informal norms, either internal ones such as their own consciences or 
external ones, like their reputations, for example, then this relationship between rates 
of detection and willingness to take aggressive or clearly illegal positions may change. 
51 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
in 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1 ,  86-91 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
52 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 (1968). 
53 This familiar conclusion of the neoclassical deterrence literature ignores the 
costs associated with investments in detection avoidance made by rule violators. That 
is, the higher the ex post penalty for violating a rule is, the greater will be the rule 
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should behave as if the probability of detection were equal to one and 
the fine equaled the harm. This same analysis has been applied to 
justify punitive damages in tort law and environmental law, among 
many other areas.54 A similar analysis could be applied to tax law as 
well. According to such an analysis, under certain restrictive 
assumptions, the optimal fine for tax underpayments ought to be the 
amount of tax underpayment divided by the probability of detection. 
To see the operation of this idea in the tax context, take the 
original Joe Taxpayer example but assume a probability of detection 
of 1 %. In such a case, Joe's ex ante compliance incentive would be 
optimized by applying a strict liability standard that assessed an 
overall fine - including both the back-taxes and penalty - equal to 
the harm (the additional taxes owed of $100) multiplied by 100 (i.e., 1 
I 0.01). Thus, in the event the tax position was detected and rejected, 
Joe would be required to pay not only the underpaid tax, but also a 
punitive fine (or a kicker) of $9900.55 By adopting a rule that would 
impose such a fine in the event of an adverse determination, the strict­
liability-plus-punitive-kicker rule forces Joe, ex ante, to internalize the 
expected tax liability associated with the transaction, which, as shown 
above, leads to the optimal tax compliance incentives even under 
conditions of legal uncertainty. (Again, this conclusion assumes Joe 
has at least $10,000 worth of assets that might be subject to the ex post 
penalty.) Recall that under the original example, Joe's optimal merits 
probability threshold was 25 % . He should only make the investment if 
he assessed the likelihood of winning on the merits to be greater than 
25 %.  Now, if the probability of detection were 1 % rather than 100%,  
violator's investment in avoiding detection. See generally Arun S .  Malik, Avoidance, 
Screening, and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RAND J. ECON. 341 (1990). For a recent 
summary of the literature on the problem of avoidance costs, see Chris William 
Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (2006). How best to respond 
to the problem of detection avoidance, and whether, for example, it makes sense to 
punish avoidance activity as well as the underlying conduct, is a subject that I will 
ignore for the purposes of this paper. Rather, I will assume that the optimal tradeoff 
has been made between the size of the relevant penalty and the amount of any 
punishment for detection avoidance. This will allow me to focus on the problem of 
substantive legal uncertainty - the uncertainty as to how the substantive law will be 
applied to the case at hand. 
54 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998). 
55 Since the optimal total damage payment is determined by harm (h) divided by 
the probability of detection (p), and the optimal punitive award is the amount in 
excess of the actual harm, the multiplier that can be used to calculate the punitive­
kicker part of the award can be written as: [(1- p) I p] * h. Id. at 890 n.51. 
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but the potential total tax liability were $10,000 rather than just $100, 
Joe would still have an incentive to make the investment (and claim 
the $100 tax benefit) only if doing so were socially efficient - that is, 
only if the 25% merits probability were exceeded. In sum, a strict 
liability rule with a Bentham-Becker punitive penalty can induce 
optimal ex ante tax compliance incentives in a world with 
substantively uncertain tax law and in which taxpayer aggressiveness 
regularly goes undetected. 
Applying the strict-liability-with-punitive-kicker regime, however, 
raises a number of conceptual and practical problems. These are the 
ex post unfairness concern, the judgment-proof taxpayer problem, the 
over-deterrence problem, and the administrability problem. I discuss 
the first three in this part and the fourth in Part VI. Some but not all 
of these concerns will apply to both a strict liability and a fault-based 
regime. All of them are connected with, and even attributable to, the 
punitive-kicker aspect of the tax penalty regime proposed in the 
previous section. 
First, even if we assume that taxpayers are perfectly rational and 
informed - and thus would be optimally deterred by a Bentham­
Becker penalty - there is the view that the Bentham-Becker punitive 
penalty would create a kind of ex post unfairness because of the 
disparity between the size of the penalty and the magnitude of the 
offense. In the criminal law context, this complaint against Bentham­
Becker penalties is often stated in terms of the punishment being out 
of proportion to the crime. Thus, for example, if an individual were to 
break the law and cause a social harm of $100, a sanction of $10,000 
on that single individual would, on this view, be considered excessive. 
The same criticism could be made in the tax context. If a taxpayer 
underpays her income by $100, and the particular mistake has only a 
1 % chance of being detected, it seems intuitively unfair that the one 
person out of 100 who gets caught will have to pay $10,000 while the 
other ninety-nine go free. Such an outcome seems especially 
problematic when the activity in question, from an ex ante 
perspective, is not clearly illegal but is only of uncertain legality. 
This injustice may be seen as further compounded by the fact that 
the size of the tax penalties imposed on taxpayers may in many cases 
reward dishonesty in the following sense: if the Service were to 
concentrate its enforcement efforts on identifying those taxpayers 
who are most likely to cheat on their taxes (a reasonable strategy), the 
probability of detection for those taxpayers would increase relative to 
the probability of detection of the taxpayers who are not so much the 
focus of the Service's scrutiny. The irony of this approach, however, is 
2007) Optimal Tax Compliance 269 
that the punitive-kicker would correspondingly be lower for those 
relatively dishonest taxpayers (the ones on whom the Service is 
focusing) and higher for the more honest taxpayers (to whom the 
Service gives less frequent or less intense scrutiny). Thus, if we loosely 
equate audit rates with detection rates, taxpayers subject to only a 1 % 
audit rate because of their historically high levels of compliance would 
face a potential noncompliance penalty equal to 100 times their tax 
understatements; whereas the taxpayers subject to a 50% audit rate 
because of their historically low levels of compliance would face a 
potential penalty of only two times their understatements. Of course, 
audit rates are not necessarily inversely correlated with relative 
honesty. For example, it may be administratively or politically more 
feasible to audit certain taxpayers at higher rates than others. But the 
perception of unfairness could still be a problem.56 
Besides the ex post unfairness problems, there is a potential 
deterrence problem as well: a rational taxpayer of the sort I have been 
assuming throughout this analysis (including an assumption of risk 
neutrality) would ignore the threat of any ex post fine that exceeds the 
amount of her assets that are available to satisfy a tax judgment. This 
fact - sometimes called the judgment-proof problem - limits the 
ability of large ex post fines to produce optimal ex ante compliance 
incentives. The problem is well known in the deterrence literature, 
56 One could argue that these ex post unfairness concerns are not present under 
the assumptions of the examples above, specifically the assumption of perfectly 
informed and rational taxpayers. That is, if taxpayers are perfectly informed of the 
merits probability of a particular tax position, perfectly informed of the likelihood of 
detection, and perfectly informed of the potential Bentham-Becker penalty they face, 
then no unfairness arises when they freely choose to assume the risk of taking the tax 
position in question. That is, under these assumptions, when a taxpayer's uncertain 
position happens to be detected by the Service and happens to be rejected and the 
penalty assessed, that would be an example of what Ronald Dworkin calls "option 
luck." See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 283, 293 {1981).  And to allow the taxpayer to bear the consequences of 
her bad option luck is, on this influential view of distributive j ustice, entirely 
appropriate. See generally id. at 185. However, insofar as the taxpayer's decision to 
engage in the uncertain tax position, and hence to subject herself to the risk of a large 
tax penalty, is influenced by irrationality or incomplete information (and thus the risk 
is in some sense not freely chosen), we might consider the result a form of bad "brute 
luck," which Dworkin (and most every egalitarian theorist) would regard as an 
appropriate grounds for redistributive intervention. Not everyone, not even every 
philosopher, is prepared to fully embrace this distinction between option luck and 
brute luck. 
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and it suggests that even with a Bentham-Becker punitive penalty in 
place, if taxpayers are judgment-proof, they will be under-deterred.57 
Interestingly, there is also an over-deterrence concern with the 
punitive-kicker penalty, although it requires that we assume risk 
aversion on the part of the taxpayers. Putting aside the judgment­
proof problem for the moment, the prospect of large tax penalties in 
conjunction with a strict liability rule can actually over-deter, that is, 
induce taxpayers to under-invest in legally uncertain tax positions. 
The point is simple enough to understand: risk-averse taxpayers facing 
a potentially large ex post tax penalty in the event their uncertain tax 
positions end up losing in court might be deterred from taking such 
positions in the first place - even when taking such positions, 
although not certain to be upheld on the merits, is well above the 
efficient merits probability threshold. That is, they would be deterred 
from making investments that they should make. Thus, for example, 
when the likelihood of succeeding on the merits for a particular 
transaction is, say, 40% ,  we know that it would be efficient for the 
taxpayer to make the investment if the optimal merits probability 
threshold is less than 40% .  (In the Joe Taxpayer example above, 
recall, that threshold was 25% .) If the taxpayer is risk-averse, the 
possibility of a $10,000 ex post tax liability might dissuade the 
taxpayer from going through with even a tax-efficient transaction, that 
is, even though the expected tax liability would be significantly less 
than the expected pre-tax profit. In that sense, then, if taxpayers are 
risk-averse, a full punitive-kicker penalty can over-deter and 
discourage efficient transactions. 
Some readers may scoff at this over-deterrence concern. They 
might say, for example, that while over-deterrence may be a 
theoretical possibility, it is a miniscule concern in the real world of tax 
enforcement. The much bigger problem, the argument goes, is under­
deterrence. The whole problem of corporate tax shelters, for example, 
which has occupied so many pages in Tax Notes, The Wall Street 
Journal, and The New York Times in recent years, is in essence a 
problem of under-deterrence. Moreover, the Treasury Department 
continues to report a substantial federal tax gap of roughly 16% -
that is, federal tax revenues are estimated to be approximately 16% 
less than they would be if all taxpayers paid what they actually owe.58 
57 This problem is acknowledged in the standard works on the Bentham-Becker 
approach to punitive sanctions. See, e.g. , Polinsky & Shavel l, Punitive Damages, supra 
note 54, at 932. 
58 I.RS. News Release FS-2005-14 {Mar. 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
newsroom/article/ O,,id=137246,00.html (Understanding the Tax Gap). 
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Thus, one might reasonably ask, how serious can the over-deterrence 
problem really be? My own view, based on very little evidence, is that 
at present the over-deterrence problem is probably small, though not 
nonexistent. Even now, I have heard anecdotal accounts of taxpayers 
who are not willing to engage in certain types of transactions that are 
tax sensitive because the tax law is too uncertain, and because the 
Service will not issue them a private letter ruling on the issue. I have 
no idea how large this problem is. The much more important point is 
that, even if it were the case that there is presently relatively little 
over-deterrence under the current tax penalty regime, we obviously 
do not currently have anything resembling a Bentham-Becker penalty 
regime. As discussed above, maximum penalties are usually limited to 
20%,  rarely higher than 75% ,  of the underpaid tax. These amounts 
are obviously far, far less than the penalties that would be the norm 
under a Bentham-Becker model, which again would be five, ten, or 
even 100 times the tax underpayment. If such large penalties were 
authorized, it is reasonable to suppose that it would not be very long 
before complaints of over-deterrence would dominate the tax news 
coverage. 
VI. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF (AND THE PROBLEMS WITH) TAX 
LIABILITY INSURANCE 
Before we get to the administrability problems with the strict tax 
liability punitive-kicker regime, consider a possible, at least partial, 
solution to the ex post unfairness and over-deterrence concerns. 
These concerns could be reduced if we allowed (and the judgment­
proof problem could be reduced if we required) taxpayers to purchase 
insurance against the possibility that a particular tax position on their 
return might be rejected by the Service and back-taxes and fines 
imposed. The insurance would cover the back-taxes, interest, 
penalties, and perhaps the legal fees as well.59 What would the effect 
of such insurance be? In theory, assuming actuarially priced insurance, 
such an innovation would convert the large ex post fines that would 
threaten taxpayers under the Bentham-Becker kicker regime into 
59 Such insurance is not merely a theoretical possibility. There is in fact a small 
but growing market for this insurance. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and 
the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339 (2005), for a description of this type 
of insurance and the deterrence concerns it can raise. An alternative to commercial ly 
provided tax liability insurance would be government provided tax insurance. Private 
letter rulings can be seen as a form of government provided insurance against 
substantive uncertainty in the tax law. 
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something approximating the taxpayer's ex ante expected tax liability. 
This theoretical result would be as close to the ideal tax treatment of 
legally uncertain tax transactions as we can get, both from a 
deterrence perspective and a distributive justice perspective. To see 
this point, go back to the original example where the efficient merits 
probability threshold was 25% ,  owing to the $75 expected pre-tax 
profit and $100/$0 potential tax liability. Additionally, assume again 
that the detection probability for the transaction is 1 % , such that the 
optimal punitive penalty is $9900, plus the $100 tax liability. Now 
imagine that Joe Taxpayer finds a particular transaction that fits this 
profile and that has a merits probability of 40% .  Joe's expected tax 
liability is thus $60.(,() Because his expected after-tax profit is $15, he 
should clearly make the investment. For the critical point, assume 
further that there are 99,999 other taxpayers in the economy taking a 
tax position with the same payoff structure as Joe's, an expected tax 
liability of $60. Assume also that all of these tax positions are 
uncorrelated with one another, in the sense that when one uncertain 
position is resolved by the Service or a court ex post, that decision has 
no effect on how the other cases will be resolved. According to these 
assumptions, only 1000 of these taxpayers will be audited, 600 of 
whom will lose their cases and be required to pay the $100 in taxes 
plus the $9900 Bentham-Becker punitive fine. Again, such a rule 
produces the right ex ante incentives. The problem, according to the 
ex post unfairness complaint, is that 600 unlucky souls are required to 
pay $10,000 each, while the other 99,400 taxpayers, who are in exactly 
the same position and who took exactly the same risk, pay nothing. 
That result could be seen as distributively unjust. 
Tax liability insurance can alleviate this injustice. Since each of 
the 100,000 taxpayers in this example has an expected tax liability of 
$60 - each is taking a 0.006 chance of paying a $10,000 tax-plus­
penalty liability - tax liability insurance, in its idealized form, would 
allow these taxpayers to shift the risk of a $10,000 payment to the 
insurer in exchange for paying the insurer a premium of roughly $60. 
If such insurance were provided, when the 1000 out of the 100,000 
taxpayers were selected for audit, and 600 of those ended up losing 
their cases, the insurer would pay the $10,000 total tax liability for 
each of the 600 unlucky ones.61 In so doing, the insurer would be 
acting in effect as a private ex ante tax collector, collecting premiums 
60 (0.4 * 0) + (0.6 * $100) = $60. 
61 The insurer could also cover the litigation costs of all 1000 selected for audit 
but we can assume that away for now. 
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of $60 from each of the taxpayers in the pool in advance and then 
eventually paying those premiums over to the government (less an 
administrative fee) .  
Ideally, this type of tax insurance could reduce the over­
deterrence problem as well as the ex post unfairness (or perceived 
unfairness) associated with the Bentham-Becker punitive sanction. 
The over-deterrence problem goes away because the threat of a large 
ex post fine goes away. The ex post unfairness concern is addressed 
through the operation of insurance risk pooling. So, unlike the 
Bentham-Becker penalty without insurance, where $6,000,000 was 
spread across 600 taxpayers, here $6,000,000 is spread equally among 
100,000 taxpayers. Moreover, if we assume that the insurer could set 
and adjust premiums perfectly to correlate with the expected tax 
liabilities of its insured (this is what I meant above by the assumption 
of actuarially fair insurance),  the strict liability rule with a Bentham­
Becker penalty would still produce optimal ex ante compliance. 
Because taxpayers would still ex ante face the expected tax liability 
associated with the investment, they would be induced to make the 
efficient decision regarding when to invest in reliance on uncertain tax 
law. 
This rosy picture ignores many complications that might make 
such tax liability insurance infeasible. One problem is more 
fundamental than the others: to the extent the tax insurer is not able 
to classify risks perfectly, there would be a degree of both ex post 
unfairness and inefficiency. Imagine that the insurer in the example 
above could not distinguish between a taxpayer who is engaging in a 
transaction with an expected tax liability of $60 and a taxpayer who is 
making an investment with an expected tax liability of $70 or $50. To 
the insurer, these all look the same. If that were true, there would be 
inefficiency, because taxpayers would not face their own expected tax 
liability. Some taxpayers who are insured would thus be induced to 
make investments that are excessively aggressive. For example, a 
taxpayer might represent to an insurer that it was going to engage in a 
transaction with an expected tax liability of $60 and then tum around 
and, in fact, engage in a transaction with an expected tax liability of 
$70. This is a version of the well-known problem of moral hazard that 
plagues all insurance arrangements to some extent. Likewise, those 
taxpayers who expected to be engaging in relatively tax-risky 
transactions (the $70 expected value transactions) would find the $60 
premium to be a bargain and would be disproportionately likely to 
purchase insurance. This would force premiums up over time, causing 
the lower-risk taxpayers on the margin to opt out of buying insurance, 
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thus leaving them uninsured and, again, potentially over-deterred. 
This is of course the tax-insurance version of adverse selection. When 
there is variance within insurance risk pools, there is concomitantly 
cross-subsidization from the low risk to the high risk insured, which 
arguably presents an ex ante unfairness concern. 
Moral hazard, adverse selection, and cross-subsidization occur to 
some extent in all insurance markets and are not considered per se 
fatal to the enterprise. Insurers generally try to combat these 
problems in a myriad of ways, not the least of which is by engaging in 
ex ante efforts at risk classification and contractual protection. For 
example, a tax-risk insurer who is approached about covering a 
particular tax transaction might hire its own tax experts to evaluate 
the legal merits of the proposed tax treatment. This would help the 
insurer to decide whether to offer the coverage, at what price, and 
under what terms. To mitigate the problem of moral hazard - that is, 
the taxpayer who says she is planning a transaction with a $60 tax risk 
but then proceeds to do a transaction with a risk of $70 - the insurer 
could, in advance of the transaction, require the taxpayer to provide 
detailed representations regarding the proposed transaction (details 
suggested by the insurer's tax experts) ,  and the breach of these 
representations by the taxpayer would be grounds for the insurer to 
void the contract. Plus, insurers could use a combination of large 
deductibles and contractual policy exclusions to try to reduce moral 
hazard and adverse selection concerns.62 Insurers have used these 
tools for decades in liability and other insurance markets and, 
interestingly, they are beginning to use them now in the small but 
growing tax-risk insurance market.63 
Another serious problem with tax-risk insurance, which 
potentially confronts all premium-financed insurance arrangements, is 
the possibility of correlated risks. In the example above, I assumed 
that all 100,000 taxpayers were engaging in transactions that posed the 
same tax risk but that were uncorrelated with each other. Those are 
the perfect conditions for the insurance risk-spreading mechanism to 
work. I have already discussed what happens when the risks being 
insured have different expected values - the problem of insufficiently 
precise risk classification. But what happens if the tax risks are 
correlated? If the insurer has not reinsured the risk, and if the 
correlated risks represent a large fraction of the insurer's overall book 
62 This in fact happens with tax transaction liability insurance. See Logue, supra 
note 59, at 388. 
63 See id. 
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of business, the result can be bankruptcy for the insurer. To see this, 
change the example so that all of the 100,000 taxpayers are doing 
precisely the same transaction, or they are doing transactions that turn 
on exactly the same uncertain legal question, such that if the legal 
uncertainty is resolved in one case, it gets resolved in all of them, 
virtually simultaneously. In that case, if those taxpayers' risks were the 
only risks that the insurer covered, and the insurer had no reinsurance 
and no large surplus of assets, it would not be able to price the 
policies. The insurer could not charge just $60 for the policies, because 
if a court were to decide against one of the taxpayers, there would not 
be sufficient funds to cover all of the claims. The insurer would have 
$6 million in premiums, but would need $100 million, since all 1000 
taxpayers selected for audit would lose their cases. In addition, the 
insurer would not be able to charge much more than $60 because the 
taxpayer-insureds would not be willing to pay more. Certainly 
taxpayers would not be willing to pay a premium of $100 (equal to the 
taxes they hoped to avoid paying on the transaction), which would be 
necessary to give the insurer certainty that it would be able to pay the 
claims when they come in.64 
This correlated-risk problem is potentially troubling, given that 
some uncertain tax issues are correlated with each other. This is 
especially true insofar as taxpayers tend to copy each other's tax 
transactions. However, the correlated-risk problem seems ultimately 
unlikely to prevent a tax-risk insurance market from arising if a 
Bentham-Becker punitive-kicker tax penalty regime were adopted. 
Why? First, there are many different sources of transactional tax law 
uncertainty, almost as many as there are sections in the Code. Second, 
there would rarely be perfect correlation of risks, even when 
taxpayers attempt to engage in very similar transactions. Often the tax 
treatment will turn on highly fact-specific issues that will be peculiar 
to the particular transaction and particular taxpayer. For that reason, 
it would be surprising if an insurer could not put together a portfolio 
of tax law risks that were relatively diversified or uncorrelated with 
each other. Moreover, insurers can, and usually do, reinsure their risks 
with other, larger insurers that have larger and more diversified 
portfolios. For the very large insurers, since their tax insurance 
business would be only a small part of their own portfolio, this 
diversification function would be performed largely in house. 
64 This is an example of the much more general insurance problem of correlated 
risks, which can make insurance markets fail. 
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One complaint that gets lodged against allowing tax-risk 
insurance in the current regulatory climate is that the availability of 
tax insurance will exacerbate an already existing under-deterrence 
problem.65 The argument is that, given the trivial penalties that 
currently exist for tax noncompliance, the existence of tax law 
uncertainty and taxpayer risk aversion are necessary to prevent the 
tax gap from increasing dramatically. Or, if risk-averse taxpayers are 
allowed to insure their penalties, competitive market forces will 
eventually motivate insurers to offer coverage for transactions that 
have zero merits probability, in which the only risk they would be 
insuring would be the risk of detection. Put differently, the worst case 
scenario with respect to tax-risk insurance would be insurance for 
clearly illegal transactions. I agree that this is a concern under the 
existing penalty structure, and in another article I have suggested 
some possible solutions, such as requiring taxpayers who purchase 
tax-risk insurance to report this fact to the Service, thus raising the 
detection risk, and hence the expected tax liability, for such 
transactions significantly.66 This problem of tax shelter insurance, 
however, would not likely arise - or would be much diminished -
under a strict liability penalty regime with a Bentham-Becker punitive 
penalty. If the penalty is set properly, the insurance premium for the 
transaction will equal the expected tax liability. In other words, for a 
transaction with a merits probability of zero, the insurance premium 
would equal the potential tax liability, making the deal not worth 
doing for the taxpayer.67 Thus, if in our example the merits probability 
were zero, the insurer would charge the taxpayer a premium of $100, 
efficiently deterring the transaction. 
An alternative to allowing risk-averse taxpayers to purchase tax 
liability insurance from commercial insurance companies would be to 
allow them to purchase such insurance directly from the government. 
That is, each of the taxpayers in the example above could pay the U.S. 
Treasury, instead of an insurance company, $60 and in exchange 
receive a commitment that the issue in question would not be 
challenged. This approach seems similar to a private letter ruling, but 
one where taxpayers are required to pay the expected tax liability in 
advance. Perhaps the better analogy would be to a settlement 
agreement between a taxpayer and the Service on some issue that the 
65 See Logue, supra note 59, at 398. 
66 Id. at 347. 
67 More generally, the liability insurance premium for a clearly illegal activity in 
a world in which accurately calculated Bentham-Becker penalties are imposed would 
equal the harm in question. 
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Service has challenged but with respect to which the legal outcome is 
uncertain. Interestingly, under either approach to dealing with tax law 
uncertainty - the private insurance approach and the government 
insurance (or settlement) approach - the key facts are that the 
taxpayers would face approximately their expected tax liability when 
making tax-sensitive investment decisions, the government would get 
the right amount of revenue under the circumstance ($6 million in our 
example involving 100,000 taxpayers), and the tax burden for these 
types of transactions would be allocated fairly across all taxpayers 
doing the deal ($60 each). Whether government insurance or private 
insurance would be the better mechanism for this is beyond the scope 
of this article. The essential point to recognize here would be that, 
under present assumptions, including the assumption of a strict 
liability rule with an ex post Bentham-Becker fine, either would 
optimize ex ante compliance and tax decision-making under 
conditions of uncertainty. 
The most serious difficulty with any attempt to adopt a full­
fledged punitive-kicker tax penalty regime on the Bentham-Becker 
model is not the ex post injustice or the over-deterrence problems or 
the problems of imperfect insurance markets. Rather, the most 
troubling concern is the administrability of the penalty provision itself. 
In the analysis thus far, it has been assumed that the ex post 
adjudicator, the Service or the court, would be able to determine with 
perfect accuracy not only the correct answer to the tax question at 
issue but also, for the purpose of calculating the penalty, the particular 
ex ante probability of detection for the particular taxpayer and tax 
issue under scrutiny. Such an assessment is obviously necessary to 
calculate the precisely correct cost-internalizing penalty. But making 
such an assessment, at least with any degree of precision, would be 
impossible. That impossibility may well be why the current tax penalty 
regime falls so far short of the Bentham-Becker ideal, with most 
penalties capped at 20% of the underpaid tax, Indeed, some 
commentators have cited this problem as a reason not even to attempt 
an ex post punitive penalty approach to dealing with the low­
probability-of-protection problem.68 Moreover, this problem is 
connected specifically to the punitive-kicker penalty and therefore 
would apply whether the tax liability rule in place were strict liability 
68 See, e.g. , Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, 
Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006) (pointing 
out the difficulty of such an ex post assessment of the ex ante probability of 
detection). 
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(as I have been discussing thus far) or fault-based (to be taken up 
below) .  
I agree that neither the Service nor any court evaluating the 
merits of a particular tax position would be able precisely to calculate 
the ex ante probability that such a position would be detected. Still, 
some rough approximation might be possible. For example, the ex 
post adjudicator, whoever it might be, could begin by relying on the 
publicly available audit rates for various classes of taxpayers.69 Such 
audit rates would almost certainly overstate the probability of 
detection for many sorts of tax issues that involve substantial legal 
uncertainty, given that many such issues avoid detection even on 
audit. However, a penalty based on audit rates would come much 
closer to the Bentham-Becker ideal than the current regime. Further, 
as a means of increasing the accuracy of the penalty for the taxpayer 
in question, the adjudicator might be allowed access to the Service's 
confidential information regarding audit strategies and audit 
probabilities. For still further refinement, the adjudicator could then 
consider evidence specific to the individual or corporation before it. 
Moreover, if we are worried about giving this much enforcement 
discretion to the Service or to the courts - that is, the discretion to 
determine the size of the ex post tax penalty based on all of these 
factors - Congress could enact a schedule of punitive fines that 
would be based on audit rates and that could be somewhat tailored to 
the class of transaction at issue. 
By offering these responses to the administrability problem, I do 
not mean to suggest that this concern should be overlooked or taken 
lightly. In my view, it is very likely that this concern may be sufficient 
reason not to adopt such a regime. However, the question is at least 
worth further study and should get more attention in the literature 
than it has received. 
To summarize the analysis thus far, under the assumptions laid 
out in Part III above, when the law is substantively uncertain - in the 
sense that there is a positive, but less than one, probability of success 
on the merits of the tax position at issue - the optimal tax penalty 
regime would involve a strict liability rule. Indeed, under present 
assumptions, a strict liability rule works when the substantive law is 
certain as well. The optimal level of penalty, however, depends on the 
probability of detection. If detection is certain, there is no need for a 
penalty in excess of the taxes owed plus interest. If detection is 
uncertain, as it always will be in the cases of interest to the present 
69 See supra note 47. 
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analysis (ones that involve substantive legal uncertainty), the penalty 
should approximate the back-taxes owed plus interest divided by the 
probability of detection. That is the famous Bentham-Becker kicker. 
Such a regime would induce the taxpayer to make optimal decisions 
regarding whether and under what circumstances to rely on uncertain 
tax law. One conclusion made clear by my analysis is that there is no a 
priori appropriate or efficient merits probability threshold or 
minimum. Rather, how certain the taxpayer ought to be about the 
substantive law before relying on it will depend on a number of 
factors, including the size of the potential tax consequences and the 
potential pre-tax profit expected from the investment. If we are 
concerned about the potential unfairness and over-deterrence effects 
of very large potential tax penalties - which could be in the 
neighborhood of five, ten, or even 100 times the underpaid tax - then 
tax penalty insurance could be offered by private insurers or the 
government. Indeed, if a Bentham-Becker penalty regime were 
enacted, such an insurance market would likely arise on its own unless 
prohibited by law and whether and how to regulate that market would 
be the resulting questions. 
The preceding analysis looked exclusively at a strict liability 
approach to tax penalties. Under such a regime, when a taxpayer is 
singled out for enforcement and has a tax position rejected by the 
adjudicator, not only is she held strictly liable for any additional tax 
she is found to owe, but she is also automatically liable for the 
underpayment penalties as well, penalties that ideally (ignoring all of 
the caveats discussed above) would be set according to the Bentham­
Becker formula. The other option of course involves some form of 
fault-based or negligence standard for assessing penalties. Indeed, the 
fault-based alternative is deserving of special attention, given that the 
current tax penalty regime employs a fault-based approach. The 
obvious questions are whether the fault-based approach could, like 
the strict liability approach, create optimal ex ante tax compliance 
incentives, and, if so, which regime could do so at lower cost. 
Relatedly, does the fault-based approach face drawbacks similar to 
those discussed above. In the next part, I explain two fundamental 
problems with using a fault-based standard for tax penalties, at least if 
the standard of fault is tied to the question of whether the taxpayer 
satisfied the optimal merits probability threshold. Then I explain why, 
notwithstanding these problems, there is a second-best argument for 
adopting, or (more accurately) continuing to use, some form of fault­
based approach to tax penalties. 
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VII. ASSESSING A FAULT-BASED TAX PENALTY REGIME 
A. Defining the Fault-Based Standard: Applying the Optimal Merits 
Probability Threshold 
If a taxpayer takes a position on her tax return that relies on a 
substantively uncertain interpretation of the tax laws, and the Service 
and the courts decide that the taxpayer happens to be wrong, then, as 
to the assessment of the underpaid taxes plus interest, the rule almost 
by definition has to be strict liability. That is, if the ex post adjudicator 
determines that a taxpayer owes more taxes than she paid (recall that 
we are assuming that the Service and courts resolve this uncertainty 
definitively ex post), then that assessment is final. The taxes must be 
paid. Joe Taxpayer cannot get out of paying his taxes simply because 
the law, ex ante, was uncertain, even if his interpretation of the law 
was reasonable.70 At bottom, the tax law is distributive in nature, and 
the adjudicator is resolving the uncertainty as to what the distributive 
burden of the tax laws ought to be.11 The interesting question involves 
the penalty, the amount imposed on the taxpayer over and above the 
underpaid tax liability. The analysis to this point has been focusing 
exclusively on the possibility of imposing such penalties on the basis of 
strict liability, which is a term and concept borrowed from tort law. 
The obvious alternative to a strict liability approach to tax penalties is 
a fault-based approach. 
What would an idealized fault-based tax penalty regime under 
conditions of substantive legal uncertainty look like? At the most 
10 Again, this conclusion assumes there are no "do overs" or "unwindings" of tax 
transactions. For a discussion of the concept of unwindings, see David Hasen, 
Unwinding Unwinding (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 87, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=999411. I f  we allowed unwindings, once a taxpayer made an investment in 
reliance on uncertain tax law and that uncertainty is eventually resolved by the 
Service or a court against the taxpayer (i.e., the court says the taxpayer's position is 
wrong and he owes more taxes), the taxpayer would be permitted to say "never 
mind . . .  I didn't want to do the deal in the first place" and the whole transaction 
would be reversed. Of course, such a result would require the acquiescence of the 
other party to the transaction. 
71 In that sense, a court's interpretation of the tax laws is akin to a court's 
interpretation of a contract between two parties: if the court interprets the contract to 
mean that X owes Y another $100, then X owes Y this amount. There is no reasonable 
interpretation exception to one's contract obligations. This conclusion does not deny, 
of course, that there can be settlements in which parties to uncertain contracts will 
compromise and split the difference, just as there can be settlements between the 
Service and taxpayers when the law is uncertain. 
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general level, a fault-based tax penalty regime can be described as 
follows: if the Service and the court determine that a taxpayer has, in 
effect, caused "harm" by taking a tax position that turns out to have 
been wrong, then whether or not the taxpayer will be required to pay 
a penalty (in addition to the back-taxes plus interest that is by 
assumption owed) will depend on whether the taxpayer's position was 
in some sense "reasonable."72 What constitutes a "reasonable" tax 
position under conditions of substantive tax law uncertainty is the 
interesting question. As it turns out, it is also a surprisingly difficult 
question to answer, even as a conceptual matter. That is to say, 
although it is simple enough to apply the torts concept of strict 
liability in the tax context (since strict liability is pretty much the same 
across all contexts - that is, the offending (or injuring) party is forced 
to pay the harm she causes plus some additional penalty in cases of 
detection uncertainty), the same cannot be said of the negligence 
standard. 
There is in fact a negligence penalty in the income tax.73 And the 
definition of negligence in tax law owes an obvious debt to tort law. 
The negligence penalty in tax is imposed for any tax underpayment 
resulting from the taxpayer's lack of "due care" or failure to do what 
"an ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances."74 
The precise meaning of due care in this context is not clear. Of course, 
the same can be said of the due care standard in tort law, where the 
issue of what constitutes a failure of ordinary prudence will typically 
be determined after the fact by a judge or jury applying an ad hoc 
analysis that takes into account all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances. Some conceptual clarity has been brought to the due 
care standard in torts, with the famous Learned Hand cost-benefit 
test, but even that seemingly straightforward analysis presents 
conceptual difficulties. The Learned Hand rule, announced in United 
States v. Carroll Towing, says that tort defendants will be found to 
have been negligent - that is, found to have violated the "due care" 
standard - if it can be shown that they failed to take precautions that 
would have reduced expected accident costs by more than the cost of 
72 I.RC.§ 6662(c). 
73 See I .RC.§ 6662(b)(l). 
74 Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985). The negligence penalty is 
separate from the substantial understatement penalty. That is, one can take an 
uncertain tax position that turns out to be wrong but is reasonable (non-negligent), 
thus avoiding the negligence penalty, but still have to pay the substantial 
understatement penalty. 
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the additional precaution.75 Under Hand's formulation, a party is 
negligent if the burden of avoiding the accident (B) was less than the 
product of the probability of the accident (P) and the potential 
liability resulting from the harm (L) and the party failed to undertake 
B.76 Although the Learned Hand standard has been influential among 
courts and commentators on tort law, it has also generated 
considerable controversy. For example, some argue that the 
information that the Learned Hand standard requires is not available 
to the factfinders who are asked to do the analysis. I will make a 
similar argument about applying a Learned Hand type standard in the 
tax penalty context. 
Before we get to that criticism, however, what would such a test 
even look like in the tax context? One possible approach to a Learned 
Hand type test for penalties - though, as discussed more fully below, 
not the approach used in the Code - would be to apply a version of 
the optimal merits probability threshold developed in previous parts 
of this article. To see how this would work, imagine that the taxpayer 
has taken a particular tax position on her return, the position has been 
scrutinized by the Service, and the position has been found wanting; 
the Service and the court have determined that the taxpayer is not in 
fact entitled to the deduction or credit she claimed, or must include 
some item of income that she excluded, and thus that back-taxes and 
interest are owed. The Service or the court would then ask whether 
the particular tax position in question, at the time the return was filed, 
had a probability of success on the merits that exceeded the optimal 
merits probability threshold for that particular position, taking into 
account the expected pre-tax profit and the potential tax 
consequences for that particular transaction. If so, the taxpayer's 
position would be considered reasonable, or non-negligent, and no 
penalties would be assessed. If, however, the ex post adjudicator 
determined that the tax position in question was ex ante below the 
optimal merits probability threshold for that transaction, the taxpayer 
would be required to pay the penalty. In other words, the taxpayer 
would in that case have taken an unreasonable tax position.77 
75 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (1947). 
76 Id. at 173. 
77 This is, of course, not the only possible definition of taxpayer due care. For 
example, due care might mean that the taxpayer has taken reasonable steps to figure 
out what the law means. On this view, reliance on an expert's advice might be 
sufficient to avoid penalties but the question would remain whether to impose some 
minimal threshold of probability of success on the merits. That is, surely reliance on 
legal advice would not excuse a clearly illegal position. Moreover, allowing reliance 
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To get a sense of how this probabilistic fault-based standard might 
be applied, return to the Joe Taxpayer example, with $75 expected 
pre-tax profit, a potential tax liability of either $0 or $100, and a 
detection probability of 0.01. For this transaction, the optimal merits 
probability threshold is 25%. That is, it is socially cost-justified for Joe 
to make the investment if the likelihood of success on the merits is 
equal to or greater than 25%, but not otherwise. Now imagine that 
Joe, after doing the requisite legal research (or having his lawyer do 
it), learns that the particular transaction has a 40% chance of 
prevailing if detected and he makes the investment. He happens to get 
selected for audit, however, and ultimately loses the case; the court 
says Joe owes another $100 of tax, which he does (as we are assuming 
that the courts are never wrong). Does he owe a penalty as well? Not 
according to the fault standard. Joe made a reasonable - by which I 
mean, socially cost-justified - estimation of the law under the 
circumstances and would have made the same choice if detection had 
been certain and the penalty equal to the harm. Therefore, under this 
theoretical tax penalty standard, Joe would owe no penalty. If, 
however, the probability of success on the merits for the transaction 
had been, say, 22%, when Joe made his investment, got caught, and 
lost his case, he would have been required to pay the punitive penalty 
as well - the additional $9900. Deterrence theory tells us that the 
punitive penalty should be calculated according to the Bentham­
Becker formula, even for a fault-based regime. With such a 
probabilistic fault-based penalty in place, taxpayers would, under 
current assumptions, be deterred from taking unreasonably aggressive 
tax positions under circumstances in which the law is uncertain. This 
result is analogous to the conclusion reached in the economic analysis 
of the negligence rule in torts.78 
on expert advice to avoid the negligence penalty would just push the penalty question 
back one step: what should the standard of care be for the expert in advising a client 
to take a particular position. 
78 According to that analysis, assuming a world similar to the one I have been 
assuming in this article (i.e., perfectly rational actors, no judicial errors, etc.), a 
negligence standard set at the efficient level of care (that is, the so-called "due care" 
standard) would induce potential tortfeasors ex ante to take all reasonable (i.e., cost­
justified) steps to minimize the incidence and severity of accidents. The seminal 
article explaining how a negligence standard in tort can induce optimal levels of 
"care" is John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 323 (1973). See also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 54-84 (1987); SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 73-
104. 
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B. The Problems with a Probabilistic Fault-Based Tax Penalty Regime 
Some of the problems with a probabilistic fault-based tax penalty 
regime are similar to the problems with a fault-based tort regime 
while some are unique to the tax context. This section discusses the 
latter type. Part VII.C below, however, resurrects the case for a 
modified version of the fault-based standard. 
So what's wrong with the above described idealized form of a 
fault-based tax penalty regime? The most obvious concern, and 
ultimately perhaps the most troubling, is the problem of 
administrability. How is the Service or a court, looking at a tax 
position that it has decided lacks merit, supposed to determine the ex 
ante optimal merits probability threshold for that particular 
transaction?79 We have thus far assumed that courts get everything 
exactly right when they resolve the tax law uncertainty ex post, but to 
expect a court to do this analysis seems excessively optimistic. 
Further, the problem seems more challenging than the problem 
(discussed earlier) of determining the ex ante probability of detection 
for the purpose of calculating the appropriate punitive penalty, which 
again would be required under both the strict liability and fault-based 
approaches. In assessing ex ante probabilities of detection, at least the 
court can rely initially on concrete information that is in the hands of 
the government, such as audit rates, as a starting point for the analysis. 
With the probabilistic fault analysis, however, the ex post adjudicator 
must determine the optimal merits probability threshold for this tax 
transaction, or, more precisely, that probability at the time the 
transaction was entered into. This means figuring out the expected 
pre-tax profit from the deal and the potential tax consequences, as 
well as making an ex post assessment of the ex ante likelihood that the 
taxpayer would ultimately succeed on the merits. As difficult as this 
last element of the fault-standard sounds (determining the ex ante 
probability of success on the merits), the Service and courts today are 
in fact asked to do this analysis when applying the various 
understatement penalties under existing law. In cases in which a 
taxpayer's reporting position is challenged and ultimately overturned 
by a court, the penalty phase of the analysis requires the court to 
make an ex post guess of the ex ante strength or weakness of the 
79 Such information cost objections to fault-based liability regimes are 
commonplace in the economic literature on deterrence. See, e.g. , LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 78; POLINSKY, supra note 36; SHA YELL, supra note 36. 
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taxpayer's legal position (literally cast in terms of probability of 
success on the merits) .80 
Even if a fault-based approach to tax penalties could be made 
administrable (a topic I will discuss below), this approach still may not 
be superior to the strict liability tax penalty regime, at least if we 
continue with the present assumptions. Both types of penalty regimes, 
by assumption, would entail the ex post analysis of the probability of 
detection, in order to set the proper Bentham-Becker penalty. 
However, only the fault-based approach would also require a second 
costly application of the appropriate merits probability threshold. One 
possible response to this observation is that, if we return to the 
standard deterrence assumptions (perfect rationality, no judicial error, 
etc.), a fault-based approach might be superior because, for game­
theoretic reasons, the penalty would never actually have to be 
imposed. Given the potential liability that the taxpayers face, and the 
all-or-nothing nature of the fault standard (that is, if you satisfy it, you 
avoid all of the penalty - all $10,000 in our example), taxpayers 
would have an incentive to be at least efficiently conservative, in the 
sense of only making investments with merits probabilities greater 
than the efficient threshold that the Service would apply to their 
conduct. As a result, again for game-theoretic reasons, all taxpayers 
would have an incentive to satisfy the fault standard and hence in 
theory there would be no need for the penalty to be imposed. To put 
this point differently, under a fault-based tax penalty regime, 
taxpayers who are taking advantage of uncertain tax rules can, in 
effect, insure themselves against the risk of a large tax penalty (should 
the uncertainty be resolved against them) by taking only reasonable 
tax positions - only positions that fall within the relevant merits 
probability threshold. Assuming that courts never make mistakes in 
their ex post penalty assessments, and taxpayers never make mistakes 
in calculating the relevant ex ante merits probability threshold, the 
decision to take only reasonable tax positions would be (almost) 
equivalent to the purchase of tax-risk insurance. The result is an 
increase in social welfare, as risk-averse taxpayers would bear less 
risk.81 Interestingly, in the general economic deterrence literature, this 
80 Those penalties, again, are usually 20% of the underpaid tax, and sometimes, 
though rarely, as high as 75%.  See supra note 22 (discussing existing tax penalty 
regime). 
81 Of course, once we allow the possibility of legal errors on the part of the 
taxpayer or the courts, risk-bearing and the demand for insurance returns. Below I 
explain why the reasonable-tax-position safe harbor is importantly different from the 
purchase tax liability insurance. 
286 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 27:241 
observation - the fault-based system's ability to reduce risk-bearing 
because the sanction is never . used - is cited as an independent 
reason, though not necessarily an overwhelming reason, to prefer the 
fault-based approach over the strict liability approach.82 
Beyond the administrative cost arguments already discussed, 
there are two fundamental problems with the use of a fault-based tax 
penalty standard. The first - the activity-level problem - is well 
known in the deterrence literature and applies to the use of a fault­
based standard in any context.83 The second - which for lack of a 
better term I will call the distributional problem - has not previously 
been discussed and applies only to the use of a fault-based standard in 
the context of tax penalties. 
The activity-level problem is straightforward: to the extent that 
taxpayers comply with the fault standard, and again assuming courts 
always reach the right result, taxpayers can be sure that they will not 
face a tax penalty. This fact, as mentioned above, reduces the risk that 
they bear. It also means, however, that they are not forced to 
internalize the cost of those tax positions that happen to turn out to be 
wrong - wrong but reasonable. As a result, they will have an 
incentive to engage in the activity beyond the point at which it is 
socially cost-justified for them to do so. We can see this point in the 
example from above. The taxpayer is considering a transaction with 
an expected pre-tax profit of $75 and a 60% chance of causing a $100 
tax liability. Under a strict liability approach, she would face an 
expected tax liability of $60, either because of the expected ex post 
fine or because of the ex ante insurance premium. Therefore, the 
taxpayer would make the investment so long as the $15 profit from 
the deal would be superior to whatever after-tax profit she could get 
from some alternative use of the investment, but not otherwise. With 
the fault-based approach however, assuming the merits probability is 
at least greater than 25 % ,  the taxpayer's expected after-tax profit 
from making the investment would be $75. Thus, she would engage in 
the transaction so long as there were no other similar investment that 
produced more than a $75 after-tax profit. In sum, the taxpayer would 
be induced to engage in the questionable transaction even when it is 
not socially cost-justified. (For example, she would invest in this 
transaction even if there were another transaction with an expected 
after-tax profit of, say, $70.) More generally, with a fault-based tax 
penalty regime, there would be an incentive to over-invest or invest 
82 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 311.  
83 See SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 23-24. 
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too often in legally uncertain tax transactions. This problem does not 
exist with strict liability, where the taxpayers are forced to internalize 
the expected tax liability associated with their investments. The 
relative superiority of strict liability over fault-based standards in 
dealing with activity-level issues on the part of "potential injurers" is 
well established in the deterrence literature, and the same arguments 
would seem to apply in virtually any deterrence context.84 
The distributional problem with a fault-based tax penalty seems 
to apply uniquely, or at least especially, to the tax context. (As far as I 
know, this problem has never been noticed before.) The problem 
arises insofar as the fault-based penalty eliminates or reduces the 
actual imposition of the tax penalties. Recall the observation above 
that, under ideal circumstances, taxpayers are induced to satisfy 
whatever threshold of reasonableness is set for them by the courts 
such that no penalties are assessed. Again, in non-tax areas, this fact is 
cited as one of the advantages of a fault-based standard because it 
means there is no risk-bearing. The difficulty is that, in the tax area, 
there is a distributional reason that we want the penalties to be 
imposed. The failure to impose the penalties actually reduces social 
welfare, for distributional reasons, not deterrence reasons. 
The best way to illustrate this point is by example. Consider our 
recurring hypothetical, the one with the 100,000 taxpayers all engaging 
in a tax transaction with a 60% chance of producing a $100 tax 
liability, and hence the expected tax liability of $60 per taxpayer. 
84 See id. at 23-25. A classic example in the torts context illustrating the 
distinction between care levels and activity levels, and how these variables come out 
differently under negligence and strict liability, involves driver-pedestrian accidents. 
Under both a strict liability rule and an idealized negligence rule, drivers will have an 
incentive to take optimal care when they drive. Under a negligence rule, however, 
drivers will drive too often (or beyond the point at which the next mile driven 
produces marginal social cost in excess of marginal social benefit) , because they will 
be immune from liability for "unpreventable" accidents. Under a strict l iability rule, 
by contrast, drivers would bear the cost of unpreventable accidents and thus would be 
induced to take into account those costs when deciding how often or how much to 
drive. POLINSKY, supra note 36, at 44-49. If we assume further that only drivers (and 
not pedestrians) can affect the probability or severity of accidents (that is, we assume 
driver-pedestrian accidents are "unilateral accidents") ,  then the above analysis 
suggests that strict liability would be the more efficient liability rule, because it can 
optimize both care levels and activity levels of potential injurers. If we assume, 
however, that pedestrians can affect the expected accident costs as well, through care­
level investments or changes in their activity levels, then the story gets more 
complicated. I am assuming for now that the choice of a tax l iability rule can only 
affect the behavior of taxpayers (the potential injurers here) and not Congress or the 
Treasury Department (acting on behalf of the "injured" fisc). 
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Hence, the transaction has 40% chance of winning on the merits. 
Under the fault-based standar.d described above, all of the 100,000 
taxpayers would have engaged in this hypothetical transaction 
because the 40% chance of prevailing on the merits would be deemed 
a "reasonable" position by a court. This is because the 40% 
probability surpasses the optimal merits probability threshold for this 
transaction (which, recall, was 25% ). According to the assumptions of 
the example, then, 1000 of those taxpayers would be audited and 600 
of those would lose their cases on the merits. For those 600 taxpayers, 
the fault-based penalty analysis would be applied and the court would 
inquire as to the reasonableness of the position taken. As noted, the 
answer would be that the position was reasonable. Thus, none of 
taxpayers would be assessed a penalty, and the total amount of tax 
revenue collected from these taxpayers for this transaction would be 
$60,000 - $100 of taxes multiplied by 600, the number of taxpayers 
who were audited and lost their cases. So what's wrong with this 
scenario? 
The problem is that, in terms of probabilistic distributive justice, 
$60,000 is approximately $5.94 million too little to be taxing this group 
of 100,000 taxpayers who are engaging in a series of transactions that 
almost certainly are collectively producing an income tax liability of 
$6 million. That is to say, if it were feasible and cost-justified to audit 
all 100,000 taxpayers who engaged in this transaction, approximately 
60,000 of the taxpayers would be found to owe $100, and the other 
40,000 taxpayers, nothing. That is what we meant above when we 
assumed that the 100,000 transactions in question had a 40% chance 
of prevailing on the merits. Of course, auditing all 100,000 taxpayers is 
by assumption not feasible. The question therefore is: what can the tax 
system do, in terms of allocating the tax burden consistently with 
society's distributional values or preferences? The answer may be 
somewhat surprising, given that every one of the 100,000 taxpayers 
engaged in a tax transaction that created an expected tax liability of 
$60; the best the income tax system can do might be to collect 
something close to $6 million from the group, getting $60 from each of 
the 100,000, since they are all equal in the eyes of the law with regard 
to these transactions. That is, as among the 100,000, the principle of 
horizontal equity would suggest that each should pay $60 in income 
taxes for engaging in the transaction in question.85 Because a fault-
85 The following is a summary of the possible distributive combinations 
associated with the strict liability and fault-based approach to tax penalties, using the 
example in the text. It assumes that a Bentham-Becker penalty regime is in place, but 
that no penalties are assessed under a fault-based regime, since all taxpayer are 
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based standard can, for game-theoretic reasons, result in the 
imposition of no penalties (again, assuming all taxpayers rationally 
decide to comply with the standard), only the strict liability tax 
penalty system, which imposes the penalty on the few audited 
taxpayers found to owe taxes, would achieve this distributively 
desirable result. That is, only the strict liability tax penalty regime 
forces taxpayers who make investments in reliance on uncertain 
(sometimes very uncertain) tax positions to bear the expected income 
tax liabilities associated with those positions.86 
Note how this result differs from the result in a nontax area of 
law, such as torts, where we do not usually think of the law as being 
explicitly distributive in nature. If we imagine tort law being primarily 
about deterring accidents, rather than about trying to achieve a 
particular distribution of income, we do not care whether the penalties 
are ever imposed. So long as, say, drivers are encouraged to drive 
carefully or manufacturers are induced to make safe products, there is 
no independent reason to require the payment of fines or damages. 
The victims of accidents caused by reasonably safe driving or 
reasonably safe products can be compensated much more efficiently 
through their own first-party insurance companies than through 
induced to meet the threshold standard of reasonableness. (1) The fault-based 
approach (with no insurance): the 600 taxpayers who are audited and lose pay $100 
each; everyone else - the 400 who are audited and win and the 999,000 who are not 
audited - pays nothing, for a total of $60,000 in taxes collected from this group (the 
other $5,940,000 would come from other taxpayers). (2) The strict liability approach 
(without insurance): the 600 taxpayers who are audited and lose pay $10,000 each; the 
400 who are audited and win, and the 999,000 who are not audited pay nothing, for a 
total of $6 million. (3) The strict liability approach (with insurance) : each of the 
100,000 who engages in the transaction pays $60, for a total of $6 million, which gets 
paid by insurer when 600 taxpayer/insureds are required to pay $10,000 each. (4) 
Changing the example to allow for a detection probability of one, 100,000 taxpayers 
get audited and 60,000 are required to pay $100 in back-taxes each (no penalty in that 
case is necessary), for a total of $6 million. 
86 Whether one believes that the strict tax liability approach, plus the Bentham­
Becker penalty, must be accompanied by tax liability insurance to achieve distributive 
justice superiority over the fault-based approach will depend largely on whether one 
is an ex ante or ex post egalitarian. That is, if you think that fairness requires only that 
each of the 100,000 taxpayers in my example be treated equal ly only with respect to 
their ex ante choice, and not the ex post outcomes, then the insurance is not 
necessary. Each of the 100,000 had the chance to decline to engage in the risky tax 
position, and if they eventually experience the large Bentham-Becker penalty, that is 
a function of pure option luck. Again, that result assumes perfectly informed 
voluntary decision-making on the part of the taxpayers, which may approximate the 
real world in cases involving sophisticated taxpayers. 
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penalties assessed by the government. But conventional wisdom 
suggests that tax law is different.87 Tax law, at least the income tax, is 
primarily about (1)  raising revenue to spend on public goods and (2) 
allocating the tax burdens in a manner consistent with our society's 
vision of distributive fairness, whatever that vision happens to be. 
Hence, when Congress decides that the tax system should collect a 
certain amount of money from taxpayers who meet a particular 
description, and thus satisfy certain criteria set out in the law, then 
failing to collect the tax from those individuals means Congress has to 
raise the money some other way, such as increasing the national debt 
or raising rates for everyone. The problem is that either of these latter 
options produces a distributive result that is different from what 
Congress intended and from the social optimum. These divergences 
from the optimal distributive outcome represent losses of social 
welfare to the same extent as do distortions of labor choices caused by 
various tax rules.88 
In sum, the main problems with a probabilistic fault-based tax 
penalty regime are that such a regime (1) is relatively difficult to 
administer, (2) owing to the activity-level effect, may result in far too 
many uncertain (albeit "reasonably uncertain") tax positions being 
taken, and (3) fails to allocate the tax liabilities associated with those 
legally uncertain transactions to the group of taxpayers who engaged 
in them. In its idealized form, the strict liability tax penalty regime 
with the Bentham-Becker penalty, accompanied by a tax transaction 
insurance regime, which could somehow deal with the adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, is able to avoid or at least 
minimize these problems. That result, however, depends on several 
key assumptions. It should come as no surprise therefore that the best 
case for using a fault-based tax penalty builds on the inapplicability of 
these assumptions in the real world. 
C. The Best Case for a Fault-Based Tax Penalty Regime 
As mentioned above, and as every tax practitioner knows, the tax 
penalty regime currently in effect for the U.S. income tax is a 
combination of (1) strict liability with respect to back-taxes and 
f57 For an argument that other areas of law besides tax might also be understood 
as having a distributive component, see Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, 
Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 
203 (2003). 
88 See Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity 
and Efficiency of the Income Tax, 49 NAT'L. TAX J. 135 (1996). 
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interest and (2) a fault-based system of sorts for penalties. What sort 
of fault-based penalty is it? In fact, as mentioned above, there are 
several tax penalties, all of which require some showing of fault on the 
part of the taxpayer. There are penalties for tax fraud, intended for 
situations in which the taxpayer knowingly and intentionally violates a 
clear tax law.89 Again, tax fraud penalties do not involve situations of 
substantive legal uncertainty. Next, there is the negligence penalty, 
imposed on the taxpayer who fails to do what a reasonable taxpayer 
would do under the circumstances.90 It is unclear what qualifies as 
reasonable in this setting, but the Service has said that a reasonable 
mistake is the sort of mistake that an average taxpayer might make, 
assuming she has made reasonable efforts to inform herself of the law 
(whatever that means). Interestingly, the Service has further defined 
reasonable care to include any tax position that has at least a 
"reasonable basis" in the law.91 Recall that the reasonable basis 
standard, which is more stringent than nonfrivolous and less stringent 
than substantial authority, is sometimes quantified as approximating 
20% likelihood of winning on the merits. Finally, the substantial 
understatement penalty applies instead of the negligence penalty to 
large tax understatements and has a more stringent fault-based 
standard. Under this penalty, the taxpayer must have more than a 
reasonable basis - she must have substantial authority for the 
questionable position.92 Here the safe harbor or target level of 
threshold probability is closer to 40% .93 And under current law, this 
target threshold probability of legal certainty rises to about 50% for 
certain categories of tax positions, such as so-called "reportable 
transactions" that are considered somewhat more questionable 
because of their nature.94 
What all of the current fault-based tax penalties have in common, 
then, are their reliance on some targeted threshold merits probability. 
How might such a penalty regime be justified, given the analysis 
above that seems to favor a strict liability penalty regime? First it must 
be recognized that a full-fledged Bentham-Becker penalty regime 
across the board to all taxpayers is unrealistic. The ex post unfairness 
and judgment-proof problems of imposing large punitive penalties on 
the few taxpayers whose tax positions are rejected on audit and the 
89 I .RC. § 6663. 
90 Treas. Reg.§ l .6662-3(b)(l) (as amended in 2003). 
91 Id. 
92 I .RC.§ 6662(d)(2)(B). 
93 Treas. Reg.§ l .6662-4(d)(2) (as amended in 2003). 
94 I .RC.§ 6664(d)(2). 
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imperfections in the tax transaction insurance response make it 
unfeasible. Although it is an interesting theoretical possibility, 
Congress will never in fact adopt a tax penalty regime that would 
impose a $9900 penalty for a tax underpayment of $100. Given this 
fact, we are probably limited to tax penalties that are far lower than 
the Bentham-Becker ideal, though it is difficult to deny that the 
normal penalty should be greater than the current 20% of the tax 
underpayments. 
If for practical or political reasons we are unlikely ever to have tax 
penalties that approximate the Bentham-Becker ideal, a reasonably 
strong argument can be made for using a fault-based approach, of the 
sort that creates target thresholds of legal certainty. The gist of the 
idea is simple: if we cannot adopt a regime that would in effect induce 
taxpayers themselves to identify the optimal merits probability 
threshold for a given transaction and to make optimal decisions at the 
margins regarding whether to rely on a particular uncertain tax 
interpretation or not, which again is what the idealized strict liability 
regime would do, we should instead choose some arbitrary merits 
probability threshold - some minimally acceptable target level of 
legal certainty - and then, through the use of penalties, try to induce 
everyone at least to meet that standard. Such an all-or-nothing penalty 
would have the effect of creating relatively strong incentives for 
taxpayer compliance, at least to the extent of the target threshold 
level of certainty. Taxpayers, by satisfying the targeted threshold level 
of legal certainty, can avoid all penalties, whereas if they fail to satisfy 
it and get caught, they owe the full penalty. This all-or-nothing effect 
would be especially strong for taxpayers who are risk-averse with 
respect to large tax penalties and when there is some uncertainty as to 
the actual application of the standard by the Service and the courts.95 
Does this mean that current law has chosen the optimal target 
thresholds of legal certainty to serve as triggers for the various 
penalties? That is, are reasonable basis, realistic possibility of success, 
substantial authority, and more likely than not the right thresholds? 
95 In addition, we might choose a fault-based tax penalty standard because we 
believe that failure to meet the minimal threshold of legal certainty imposed by the 
tax law is a signal that the taxpayer is probably cheating on her taxes in other ways 
that we cannot see. That is, we may decide that, because we cannot detect all 
instances of bad conduct and we cannot impose a Bentham-Becker penalty to make 
up for this failure of detection (even if we wanted to) , then, when we do discover 
behavior that falls below some threshold level of acceptability, we will make that an 
occasion for punishment. I thank my colleague Omri Ben-Shahar for suggesting this 
possibility to me. 
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Does the law assign the right legal certainty target for the right types 
of transactions? These are impossible questions to answer. My own 
instinct would be that, in addition to increasing the magnitude of 
penalties, it would be useful to increase the threshold target level of 
certainty for all fault-based penalties to more likely than not. The 
alternative would be to keep the general shape of the current penalty 
regime, which imposes a higher certainty threshold for (1) uncertain 
tax positions that are not disclosed to the Service (and hence that have 
a lower probability of detection) and (2) tax positions that are similar 
in structure to positions that are known to be especially aggressive, 
but perhaps to raise the level of certainty required for any type of tax 
position to avoid penalties. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
No matter how hard Congress and the Treasury Department try 
to specify the precise tax treatment of every conceivable situation, this 
can't be done. There will always be gaps in the tax laws. Given this 
fact, what tax penalty regime will induce taxpayers to make the right 
choice regarding whether, and under what conditions, to rely on a 
particular uncertain interpretation of the law? This question is made 
much more interesting, and problematic, due to a second type of legal 
uncertainty: detection uncertainty, or the uncertainty as to whether a 
particular tax position will even be questioned by the enforcement 
authorities. The combination of these two types of legal uncertainty 
creates a serious tax enforcement problem. 
Applying the traditional framework of deterrence theory, which I 
borrow from the tax policy and law-and-economics literatures, this 
article reaches a number of novel conclusions regarding the optimal 
level of tax compliance and the optimal tax compliance penalties 
when the substantive tax law is uncertain. 
First, the optimal level of legal certitude that a taxpayer should 
have before claiming a substantively uncertain tax benefit will, under 
a number of assumptions to be specified below, depend on (1) the 
amount of tax benefit at stake in the particular investment, (2) the size 
of the potential pre-tax profit from the investment, and (3) the 
taxpayer's attitude towards risk. 
Second, if we assume there is no "detection uncertainty" (that is, 
if we assume that any legal violation will be detected with certainty), a 
simple rule of strict liability for back-taxes plus interest with no 
additional, punitive penalty produces optimal ex ante tax compliance 
incentives. 
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Third, if we assume (1)  that there is some detection uncertainty 
(that is, a positive, but less than one, probability of detection),  (2) that 
there is no upper limit on the amount of the potential ex post penalty 
that can be imposed on taxpayers who underpay, and (3) that the ex 
post law enforcer, either the Service or court, can accurately 
determine the ex ante probability of detection for the particular 
activity in question, then a strict liability rule with a punitive "kicker" 
achieves optimal ex ante tax compliance incentives when there is 
substantive legal uncertainty. 
Fourth, if we assume that taxpayers are risk-averse, some form of 
tax insurance could be used to convert the risk of a large ex post tax 
liability to a certain payment of the taxpayer's expected tax liability. 
Given these conclusions, another interesting question arises: 
Under what circumstances might a fault-based tax penalty regime be a 
superior, or least a plausible, alternative to a strict liability regime? 
What exactly should the fault-standard look like? How would it be 
applied by the ex post adjudicator, whether that role is filled by the 
Service or a court? What makes these questions especially interesting 
is that the current tax penalty system in the United States for federal 
income taxes is a fault-based regime rather than a strict liability 
regime. That is, although the Code obviously applies a strict liability 
standard for the underpaid taxes and interest (i.e., taxpayers owe 
whatever the courts determine the Code says they owe), tax penalties 
under the Code are determined on the basis of a fault-based standard. 
Under current rules, taxpayers can avoid penalties if they can show 
that they have met what amounts to a reasonableness standard. With 
respect to the fault-based approach to income tax penalties, this 
article reaches two more conclusions: 
One, if we maintain all of the traditional assumptions of classical 
economic analysis and we assume that there is no upper limit on the 
size of potential ex post fines for tax avoidance, a fault-based tax 
penalty is inferior to a strict liability approach for three reasons: (1)  
the fault-based regime is  more difficult to administer; (2) it 
encourages taxpayers to over-invest, or invest too often, in legally 
uncertain tax positions; and (3) the fault-based regime fails to achieve 
the same degree of rough distributive justice that the strict liability 
approach does (with tax insurance) .  
Finally, if we relax some of the traditional economic assumptions 
such as perfect rationality and the absence of informal social 
sanctions, and if we assume that there are upper limits on the amount 
of tax penalties that society can reasonably impose, a case can be 
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made for using a fault-based tax penalty regime not entirely different 
from the one that is currently in force. 
All of these conclusions are based on some pretty strong 
assumptions. Some of the assumptions, although obviously unrealistic 
(such as the perfectly rational taxpayer assumption and the infallible 
Service and court assumption), do not tend to favor one penalty 
regime over another. Others, however, may actually affect the 
comparison. For example, if it simply is not possible, for political or 
other reasons, to impose large punitive penalties that approximate 
those suggested by the Bentham-Becker model, then it is not clear 
that a strict liability regime is superior to a fault-based regime. In that 
case, a fault approach, with an arbitrarily chosen - and somewhat 
high - targeted merits probability threshold might induce a higher 
level of tax compliance than would a strict liability rule, especially if 
taxpayers are risk-averse (and not allowed to insure) and hence would 
have a tendency to over-comply with the uncertain standard.96 Also, if 
we allow for the possibility of informal sanctions, such as social norms 
against tax noncompliance, which we have been assuming away, it 
might be that lower formal penalties would lead to higher informal 
penalties; and the combination might provide greater overall 
deterrence than the imposition of a true Bentham-Becker penalty 
regime.97 The possible interaction between formal and informal tax 
sanctions, between tax law and tax norms, raises very important 
questions, but I have left those questions for another day. 
Besides the fact that 20% and 30% underpayment penalties are 
probably too low to get the ex ante compliance incentives right, this 
article takes no ultimate position on which tax penalty regime is best. 
Rather, the goal of this article has been to set forth a framework for 
analyzing this question. My own tentative view is that a fault-based 
tax penalty standard might work best with most individual taxpayers 
but that with corporate taxpayers (and perhaps some wealthy 
individual taxpayers) a strict liability approach with something 
approaching Bentham-Becker penalties and private or 
government-provided tax transaction insurance - might be worth 
96 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on 
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984). 
97 This might be true, for example, if it turned out that formal tax penalties, such 
as those provided in the Code and enforced by the Service, had the effect of 
"crowding out" more informal sanctions for tax noncompliance. Of course, formal 
and informal penalties do not necessarily have to interact as substitutes but could also 
be complements, in which case cutting formal penalties may send the wrong message 
and actually encourage noncompliance. 
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trying. The other interesting question raised by this article's analysis is 
whether the same questions are raised - such as the question of the 
optimal merits probability threshold - and the same framework 
could be applied to any area of law in which the substantive legal 
standards and rules are uncertain. 
